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Abstract. This paper provides a formula for the sacrifice bit-length for privacy
amplification with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol for finite key lengths when we
employ the decoy method. Using the formula, we can guarantee the security parameter
for realizable quantum key distribution system. The key generation rates with finite
key lengths are numerically evaluated. The proposed method improves the existing
key generation rate even in the asymptotic setting.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol proposed by Bennett-Brassard [1] is one of
the most applicable protocols in quantum information. The conventional BB84 QKD
protocol generates keys with the matched bases‡, which are called raw keys and are
trivially shown to be secure with the noiseless channel and the perfect single photon
source. However, in the realistic setting, there are two obstacles for security. One is
the noise of the communication quantum channel. Due to the presence of the noise,
the eavesdropper can obtain a part of information of raw keys behind the noise. The
second one is the imperfection of the photon source. If the sender sends the two-photon
state instead of the single photon state, the eavesdropper can obtain one photon so
that she can obtain information perfectly. Many realized QKD systems have been
realized with weak coherent pulses. In this case, the photon number of transmitted
pulses obeys the Poisson distribution, whose average is given by the intensity µ of the
pulse. The first problem can be resolved by the application of the error correction and
the random privacy amplification to raw keys [2, 3, 4, 5]. In the privacy amplification
stage, we amplify the security of our raw keys by sacrificing a part of our raw keys.
The security of final keys depends on the decreasing number of keys in the privacy
amplification stage, which is called the sacrifice bit-length. Shor-Preskill [2] and Mayers
[3] showed that this method gives the secure keys asymptotically when the rate of
the sacrifice bit-length is greater than a certain amount. In order to solve the second
problem, Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP)[6] extended their result to the
case when the photon source has the imperfection. However, GLLP’s result assumes
the fractions of respective photon number pulses among received pulses. Indeed,
there is a possibility that the eavesdropper can control the receiver’s detection rate
dependently of the photon number because pulses with the different photon number
can be distinguished by the eavesdropper. In order to solve this problem, we need to
estimate the detection rate of the single photon pulses. Hwang proposed the decoy
method to estimate the detection rate [7]. This method has been improved by many
researchers[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. In this method, in order to estimate the
detection rates, the sender randomly chooses several kinds of pulses with different
intensities. The first kind of pulses are the signal pulses, which generate raw keys. The
other kind of pulses are the decoy pulses, which are used for estimating the operation
by the eavesdropper and have a different intensity from the signal pulses.
However, we still cannot realize a truly secure QKD system in the real world
due to the finiteness of the coding length. Most of the above results assume the
asymptotic setting except for Mayers[3]. Also, their privacy amplification requires many
calculation times. Renner [17] proposed to use universal2 hash functions for privacy
amplification and showed the security under this kind of hash functions. Universal2 hash
‡ In this paper, when Alice’s basis is the same as Bob’s basis, the basis is called matched.
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functions have been recognized as a fundamental tool for information theoretical security
[18, 19, 20, 21]. His security proof is quite different from the traditional Shor-Preskill
formalism in the following points. He focused on the trace norm of the difference between
the true state and the ideal state as the security parameter because the trace norm is
universally composable [38]. In the following, we call the trace norm the universal
composability criterion. As another different point, he employed the left over hashing
lemma (privacy amplification) while the traditional Shor-Preskill formalism employs
error correction. On the other hand, in the context of the traditional Shor-Preskill
formalism, it was shown that the leaked information can be evaluated only by the
phase error probability[5, 22, 23, 24, 25], which implies that the phase error correction
guarantees the security. Using this fact, a previous paper [26] showed that the security
under a wider class of hash function, which is called ε-almost dual universal2 hash
function.
In order to treat the finiteness problem in the single photon case, when n is the
block length of our code, another previous paper[5] considers the asymptotic expansion
of the coding length up to the order
√
n§ with Gaussian approximation by using the
above phase error correction formalism. Scarani et al.[31] and Sano et al. [32] also
treated the finiteness problem only for collective attack. Recently, using Renner’s
formalism, Tomamichel et al [33] derived an upper bound formula for the security
parameter with the finite coding length. However, these results assume the single
photon source. Furrer et al.[35] gave a finite-length analysis with continuous variable
quantum key distribution, which works with weak coherent pulses. While continuous
variable quantum key distribution can be implemented with an inexpensive Homodyne
detection, the decoy method with BB84 protocol can achieve the longest distance with
the current technology[36, 37]. Hence, we treat the security of finite coding length of
BB84 protocol when we use weak coherent pulses and the decoy method.
In the single photon case, using the phase error correction formalism, another
previous paper [34] derived better upper bound formulas for the security with the finite
coding length, which attain the key generation rate given in [5] up to the order
√
n.
They also treated the security with the universal composability based on the phase
error correction formalism when the coding length depends on the outcomes of Alice
and Bob. The phase error correction formalism provides an upper bound of the leaked
information only from the decoding phase error probability. Hence, we employ the
phase error correction formalism for our security analysis of finite coding length of
BB84 protocol when we use weak coherent pulses and the decoy method.
§ Analysis of this type of asymptotic expansion is called the second order analysis and has attracted
attention among information theory community due to the relation with analysis of finite coding
length[27, 28, 29, 30].
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1.2. Our formula for sacrifice bit-length with the finite-length setting
When the raw keys are generated by BB84 protocol with the weak coherent pulses by
the decoy method, we apply the error correction and the privacy amplification to the
raw keys. The security of final keys can be evaluated by the amount of the sacrifice
bit-length. The aim of this paper is to provide a calculation formula of the sacrifice
bit-length guaranteeing a given security level with the universal composability. Since
the generated pulses contain the vacuum pulses, the single-photon pulses, and the multi-
photon pulses, we need to estimate these ratios among the pulses generating the raw
keys. Note that the vacuum pulses also generate a part of raw keys. The flow of our
analytical framework is illustrated as Fig. 1. First, using the relation between phase
error and the security, we give a formula of the sacrifice bit-length based on the numbers
of the detected pulses originated from the vacuum emissions by Alice, the detected
pulses from the single-photon emissions, and the detected pulses from the multi-photon
emissions among the detected pulses consisting of the raw keys. In the following, we
call these numbers the partition of the detected pulses generating the raw keys. When a
component of the partition are divided by total pulse number, we obtain the fractions.
For the finite-length analysis, we need the partition instead of the fractions.
In order to estimate the partition of the detected pulses generating the raw keys,
we need to estimate the detection rates of respective kinds of pulses and the phase
error probability of single photon pulses, which characterize Eve’s operations and can be
regarded as parameters of the quantum communication channel. For this purpose, Alice
sends the pluses with different intensities. This method is called the decoy method, and
enables us to estimate the above detection rates and the phase error probability of single
photon pulses. This estimation part can be divided into two parts. The first part is the
derivation of channel parameters from the detection rates, the phase error rates, and the
partition of respective transmitted pulses by solving joint inequalities, which are given
from non-negativity of several channel parameters. The second part is the treatment
of statistical fluctuation. If we could treat infinite number of pulses, we had not had
to deal with the statistical fluctuation. However, our finite-length setting requires the
treatment of the statistical fluctuation. In contrast with the previous papers [34, 5], this
paper deals with the statistical fluctuation by interval estimation‖ and percent point¶.
The interval estimation is employed for deriving the detection rates and the phase error
rates of transmitted pulses with respective intensities from the observed detection rates
and the observed phase error rate. The percent points are employed for deriving the
partitions of transmitted pulses with respective intensities. Similarly, we employ percent
‖ Interval estimation is a statistical method to give an interval of possible (or probable) values of an
unknown parameter from sample data, in contrast to point estimation, which is a single number. The
method of the binomial case is explained in Appendix B.
¶ Precisely, the percent point means the lower percent point or the upper percent point dependently of
the context. When we focus on the ε percent, the lower percent point of the random variable X is the
value x1 satisfying the following. The probability that the random variable X is less than x1 is ε/100.
For example, the lower 5% point of a standard normal distribution is -1.645.
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points for deriving the partition of the detected pulses generating the raw keys from the
channel parameters.
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Figure 1. Roles of percent points and interval estimation
In our analysis, we focus on the universal composability criterion. Our calculation
formula for the sacrifice bit-length employs only the basic formulas of percent points
and the interval estimation of the binomial distribution, whose numerical calculations
are possible by many computer software packages. Hence, it does not contain any
optimization process, and then it requires a relatively shorter calculation time. Then,
using our formula, we numerically calculate the key generation rate per pulses in
several cases. In our numerical calculations, we require that the universal composability
criterion is less than 2−80. Under this requirement, we have to require too small error
probabilities to calculate the exact percent point and the exact interval estimation.
For this purpose, we employ Chernoff bound, which is an upper bound of the
error probability and requires a quite small amount of calculations, as summarized in
Appendix. Using Chernoff bound, we can derive upper and lower estimates of the true
parameter. Since Chernoff bound is not the tight bound of the error probability, these
upper and lower estimates are looser than the exact interval estimation. However, even
when the required error probabilities are very small, when the size of obtained data
is sufficiently large, these upper and lower estimates are sufficiently close to the exact
interval estimation+.
Further, similar to Wang et al.[15, 16], in Section 6, we discuss our key generation
rate with finite-length when the intensities are not fixed and obey certain probability
+ The reason is the following. The rate of Chernoff bound to the true error probability behaves
polynomially with respect to the size of data. In particular, in the binary case, the rate behaves
linearly with respect to the size of data. Hence, even when the required error probabilities are very
small, when the size of obtained data is sufficiently large, these upper and lower estimates are sufficiently
close to the exact interval estimation.
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distributions. In Subsection 6.2, we numerically calculate the above key generation rate
when the intensities obey Gaussian distributions because the fluctuations of intensities
are usually caused by the thermal noise.
Here, we summarize the physical assumption. The photon source generates the
coherent state, and the phase factor of the coherent state is completely randomized. The
receiver uses the threshold detector. We do not care about other types of imperfection
of devices. In particular, we assume no side-channel-attack, i.e., Eve cannot directly
see the phase modulator in Alice’s side. Further, we do not assume the perfect vacuum
pulses. That is, we allow that a non-vacuum state comes to be mixed in the vacuum
pulses if the probability of erroneous emission of a non-vacuum state is sufficiently small.
We do not assume the collective attack while we employ the binary distribution. That
is, our security proof well works for the coherent attack. The reason why the binary
distribution can be used instead of the hypergeometric distribution is given in Section
7.
1.3. Organization
The organization of the remaining part is the following. As a preparation, Section 2
reviews the result for the universal composability criterion of the final keys when we
know the partition of the received pulses and the phase error probability among single
photon pulses. Then, Section 2 derives the leaked information from the partition of
detected pulses of raw keys by using the relation between the phase error and security,
i.e., Step (5) in Fig. 1. Section 3 describes a concrete protocol of the decoy method.
Section 4 explains how eavesdropper’s operation can be described. Section 5 gives two
formulas of the sacrifice bit-length. Subsection 5.2 gives a shorter sacrifice bit-length
by improving the formula given in Subsection 5.1. So, we call the formula given in
Subsection 5.2 the improved formula and we call the formula given in Subsection 5.1
the non-improved formula. Since the improved formula is too complicated, we give
the non-improved formula in Subsection 5.1. After describing the whole structure of
the non-improved formula, we give the improved formula in Subsection 5.2. Then, we
present a numerical result with the improved formula. In Section 6, we treat the finite
sacrifice bit-length when the source intensity is not fixed. Then, we present a numerical
result with Gaussian distribution.
The remaining sections are devoted to the security proofs of the formulas given in
Section 5. For this purpose, Section 7 summarizes a fundamental knowledge for random
variables because the notation explained in Section 7 will be used in latter sections.
Since the improved formula is too complicated, we first show the security proof of the
non-improved formula in Sections 8, 9, and 10. After the security proof of the non-
improved formula, we give the security proof of the improved formula in Section 11.
Section 8 briefly describes our security proof and the outline of discussions in the latter
sections. It also gives the sacrifice bit-length from the leaked information, i.e., Step (6)
in Fig. 1. Section 9 gives the estimate of channel parameters when the partition of
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the generated sources is given. Subsection 9.1 gives the partition of detected pulses of
raw keys from the channel parameters by using percent points i.e., Step (4) in Fig. 1.
Subsection 9.2 estimates the channel parameters from the partitions and the detection
rates of several kinds of transmitted pulses by solving joint inequalities, i.e., Step (3) in
Fig. 1, and Subsection 9.3 derives the detection rates of decoy pulses from the observed
data based on interval estimation, i.e., Step (1) in Fig. 1. In Section 10, we treat
statistical fluctuation of the photon number of the sources. In particular, Subsection
10.2 gives the partitions of several kinds of transmitted pulses by using percent points,
i.e., Step (2) in Fig. 1. Then, combining the discussions in Sections 8, 9, and 10, we
show the security under the sacrifice-length given by non-improved formula given in
Subsection 5.1. In Section 11, we give the security proof of the improved formula given
in Subsection 5.2 by putting out several probabilities from the square root.
In Appendices A and B, we summarize the basic knowledge for the tail probability
and the interval estimation under the binary distribution. In Appendix C, we summarize
calculations required for the numerical calculation in Subsection 6.2.
2. Relation between security evaluation and decoding phase error
probability
An evaluation method to use the trace norm of the difference between the true state
and the ideal state is known as a universally composable security criterion in QKD
[38]. Hence, we call it the universal composability criterion. When the length m of
the final keys is not fixed, we need a more careful treatment. We denote the final
state and Eve’s final state by ρAE|m and ρE|m, respectively when the length of the
final keys is m. Our ideal Alice’s state is the uniform distribution ρmix |m on m bits.
Hence, the ideal composite state is ρmix |m ⊗ ρE|m. We denote the state indicating
that the length of final keys is m, by |m〉〈m|, and its probability by P (m). Then,
the state of the composite system is ρAE :=
∑
m P (m)|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρAE|m, and its ideal
state is ρideal :=
∑
m P (m)|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρmix |m ⊗ ρE|m. Hence, the averaged universal
composability criterion of the obtained keys is written as the trace norm of the difference
between the real state ρAE of the composite system and its ideal state ρideal as [39]
∗
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1. (1)
Thus, a smaller trace norm guarantees more secure final keys.
On the other hand, when we apply surjective universal2 linear hash functions as the
privacy amplification [23], [34, (10)] the above value is bounded by the averaged virtual
decoding phase error probability Pph as
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ 2
√
2
√
Pph. (2)
Then, the security analysis of QKD can be reduced to the evaluation of Pph.
In the following, we consider the protocol containing the privacy amplification with
the sacrifice bit-length S over the raw keys with length M . When phase error occurs in
∗ The relation of this quantity with Eve’s success probability is given in Appendix D
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E bits amongM-bit raw keys and we apply the minimum length decoding, the averaged
virtual decoding phase error probability Pph is evaluated as♯
Pph ≤ 2Mh(min( EM , 12 ))−S. (3)
Hence, we can guarantee the security of the final keys when the sacrifice bit-length S is
sufficiently larger thanMh(min( E
M
, 1
2
)). However, the number E of bits having the phase
error does not take a deterministic value, and it obeys a probability distribution Q(E).
Then, when we apply the minimum length decoding, the averaged virtual decoding
phase error probability Pph is evaluated as
Pph ≤
∑
E
Q(E)min(2Mh(min(
E
M
, 1
2
))−S, 1). (4)
When we use an imperfect photon source, theM transmitted pulses generateM-bit
raw keys. Then, each of the M transmitted pulses takes the following three types of
states. The first is the vacuum state, the second is the single-photon state, and the third
is the multi-photon state. In the following, we assume that the M transmitted pulses
consist of J (0) pulses with the vacuum state, J (1) pulses with the single-photon state,
and J (2) pulses with the multi-photon state. This assumption guarantees the relation
M = J (0) + J (1) + J (2). That is, the triplet (J (0), J (1), J (2)) gives the partition of the
M transmitted pulses. When we send the pulse with the vacuum state, no information
can be leaked to Eve. That is, the leaked information in this case equals the leaked
information to Eve when we send single-photon pulses with phase error probability 0.
On the other hand, in the multi-photon case, we have to consider that all information is
leaked to Eve. Hence, the leaked information in the multi-photon case equals the leaked
information to Eve when we send single-photon pulses with phase error probability 1/2.
In the following, we assume that the phase error occurs in J
(1)
e bits among J (1) bits.
As is shown in [23, (19)] and [26], when we apply a proper class of hash functions in
the privacy amplification††, the averaged virtual decoding phase error probability Pph
is evaluated as †
Pph ≤ 2φ(J(0),J(1),J
(1)
e )−S (5)
because J (2) = M − J (0) − J (1), where we define
φ(J (0), J (1), J (1)e ) := J
(1)h(min(
J
(1)
e
J (1)
,
1
2
)) + (M − J (0) − J (1))h(1
2
)
= J (1)h(min(
J
(1)
e
J (1)
,
1
2
)) + (M − J (0) − J (1)), (6)
♯ It is easy to see that Inequality (5) holds when the completely random matrices (a type of universal2
hash functions) are used for PA, as in Koashi’s case [24].
††More precisely, when we apply ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions, Pph is evaluated as Pph ≤
ε · 2φ(J(0),J(1),J(1)e )−S . As is explained in [26], several practical hash functions, e.g., the concatenation
of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix, are 1-almost dual universal2.
† In the derivation[23, (19)], we considered that the J (1) qubits have the phase error rate min(J(1)e
J(1)
, 12 )
and the J (2)(=M − J (0) − J (1)) qubits have the phase error rate 1/2.
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which provides Step (5) in Fig. 1. Due to Eq. (5), we can regard φ(J (0), J (1), J
(1)
e ) as a
leaked information.
In the actual case, the values J (0), J (1), and J
(1)
e do not take deterministic values,
and obey a joint distribution Q(J (0), J (1), J
(1)
e ). Hence, the averaged virtual decoding
phase error probability Pph is evaluated by
Pph ≤
∑
J(0),J(1),J
(1)
e
Q(J (0), J (1), J (1)e )min(2
φ(J(0),J(1),J
(1)
e )−S, 1). (7)
In the general case, the size of sacrifice bit-length S also does not take a deterministic
value, and is stochastically determined. In such a case, the values J (0), J (1), J
(1)
e , and S
obey a joint distribution Q(J (0), J (1), J
(1)
e , S), and the averaged virtual decoding phase
error probability Pph is evaluated by
Pph ≤
∑
J(0),J(1),J
(1)
e ,S
Q(J (0), J (1), J (1)e , S)min(2
φ(J(0),J(1),J
(1)
e )−S, 1). (8)
In the following, for a simplicity, we employ the notations J = (J (0), J (1), J
(1)
e ) and
φ(J) := φ(J (0), J (1), J
(1)
e ).
3. Protocol of decoy method
In the following, we assume that Ms-bit raw keys are generated by Ns signal pulses
generated by an imperfect photon source. Now, we assume that there are N
(0)
s vacuum
state pulses and N
(1)
s single-photon pulses among Ns transmitted pulses. Then, the
remaining N
(2)
s = Ns − N (0)s − N (1)s pulses take multi-photon states. In the following
discussion, the partition of Ns signal pulses is described by the triplet (N
(0)
s , N
(1)
s , N
(2)
s ),
and plays an important role.
Now, we prepare three parameters q¯(0), q¯(1), and b¯
(1)
× as follows. The parameter q¯
(0)
is the detection rate in the vacuum pulse, i.e., the rate of the vacuum pulses detected
in Bob’s side to the vacuum pulses transmitted from Alice’s side. The parameter q¯(1) is
the detection rate in the single-photon pulse, i.e., the rate of the single-photon pulses
detected in Bob’s side to the single-photon pulses transmitted from Alice’s side. The
parameter b¯
(1)
× is the rate of the single-photon pulses detected with phase error in Bob’s
side to the single-photon pulses transmitted from Alice’s side. We call the rate b¯
(1)
× the
phase-error detection rate in the single-photon pulse. Then, the numbers J (0), J (1), and
J
(1)
e can be estimated as
J (0) ∼ N (0)s q¯(0), J (1) ∼ N (1)s q¯(1), J (1)e ∼ N (1)s b¯(1)× . (9)
However, it is not easy to estimate the partition of Ns pulses, i.e., (N
(0)
s , N
(1)
s , N
(2)
s ).
Now, we consider the case when the Ns µ1-intensity weak coherent pulses are
transmitted.
Then, we obtain the expansion with respect to the photon-number states.
∞∑
n=0
e−µ1
µn1
n!
|n〉〈n| = e−µ1 |0〉〈0|+ e−µ1µ1|1〉〈1|+ e−µ1µ21ω2ρ2, (10)
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where
ρ2 :=
1
ω2
∞∑
n=2
µn−21
n!
|n〉〈n|, ω2 := 1
µ21
(eµ1 − (1 + µ1)). (11)
Then, the partition can be estimated as
N (0)s ∼ Nse−µ1 , N (1)s ∼ Nse−µ1µ1. (12)
Hence, it is needed to estimate the parameters q¯(0), q¯(1), and b¯
(1)
× . For this purpose,
we shuffle µ1-intensity coherent pulses and µ2-intensity coherent pulses. This method is
called the decoy method [7, 8, 9, 12, 13] ‡ because µ2-intensity pulses work as “decoy”
for estimating the parameters q¯(0), q¯(1), and b¯
(1)
× . Hence, the intensity µ1 to be used to
generating the raw keys is called the signal pulse, and the other intensity µ2 is called the
decoy pulse. In the following, we assume that µ1 < µ2. Then, the µ2-intensity coherent
pulse has the following expansion:
∞∑
n=0
e−µ2
µn2
n!
|n〉〈n| = e−µ2 |0〉〈0|+ e−µ2µ2|1〉〈1|
+ e−µ2µ22ω2ρ2 + e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)ω3ρ3, (13)
where
ρ3 :=
1
ω3
∞∑
n=3
µn−22 − µn−21
(µ2 − µ1)n! |n〉〈n|
ω3 :=
1
µ22
(eµ2 − (1 + µ2 + µ
2
2
2
))− 1
µ21
(eµ1 − (1 + µ1 + µ
2
1
2
)). (14)
Using the difference between the coefficients in two expansions (10) and (13), we can
estimate the detection rates q¯(0) and q¯(1) by the way explain in Section 6.
In this paper, we use the superscript numbers and the subscript numbers in the
following rules. The superscript expresses the kind of state, i.e., the superscripts 0, 1, 2,
and 3 correspond to |0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|, ρ2, and ρ3, respectively. The subscript expresses the
intensity except for ρ2, ρ3, ω2, and ω3. That is, the subscripts 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 correspond
to the vacuum pulse, the µ1-intensity pulse, the µ2-intensity pulse, the µ1-intensity pulse
with the phase error, and the µ2-intensity pulse with the phase error, respectively.
In the following, we give the detail of our protocol, in which, both µ1-intensity pulses
with the bit basis and µ2-intensity pulses with the bit basis are used for generating the
raw keys.
(1) Transmission: Alice (the sender) sends the pulses with the vacuum, the µ1-
intensity coherent pulses and the µ2-intensity coherent pulses, randomly with a
certain rate. Here, she chooses the bit basis and the phase basis with the ratio
1 − λ : λ among the µ1-intensity coherent pulses and the µ2-intensity coherent
pulses.
‡ In a wider sense, we can regard the check bits estimating the phase error probability as another kind
of decoy state.
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(2) Detection: Bob (the receiver) chooses the bit basis and the phase basis with the
ratio 1 − λ : λ and measures the pulses in the received side. Then, he records
existence or non-existence of the detection, his basis, and the measured bit. For
the detail, see Remark 2.
(3) Verification of basis: Using the public channel, Alice sends Bob all information
with respect to the basis and the intensity for all pulses. Using the public channel,
Bob informs Alice what pulses has the matched basis. Then, as is illustrated in
Table 1, they decide the numbers N0, N1, N2, Ns,1 and Ns,2 as follows. N0 is the
number of vacuum pulses, N1 is the number of µ1-intensity pulses with the phase
basis in the both sides, N2 is the number of µ2-intensity pulses with the phase basis
in the both sides, Ns,1 is the number of µ1-intensity pulses with the bit basis in the
both sides, and Ns,2 is the number of µ2-intensity pulses with the bit basis in the
both sides.
(4) Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob announce all bit information with respect
to N1 +N2 pulses with the phase basis in the both sides. Then, as is illustrated in
Table 2, they decide the numbers M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, Ms,1 and Ms,2 as follows.
M0 is the number of vacuum pulses detected by Bob. For i = 1, 2, Mi(Mi+2) is
the number of µi-intensity coherent pulses those are detected by Bob and have
the phase basis in the both sides and the agreement bit values (the disagreement
bit values). (However, they will not use M4.) Ms,1 is the number of µ1-intensity
coherent pulses those are detected by Bob and have the bit basis in the both sides.
Ms,2 is the number of µ2-intensity coherent pulses those are detected by Bob and
have the bit basis in the both sides.
In the following, we describe the key distillation protocol for Ms,1-bit raw keys
generated by the µ1-intensity coherent pulses. The key distillation protocol for Ms,2-bit
raw keys generated by the µ2-intensity coherent pulses can be obtained when Ns,1 and
Ms,1 are replaced by Ns,2 and Ms,2, respectively.
(5) Error correction: First, Alice and Bob choose a suitableMs,1-bit classical code C1
that can correct errors of the expected bit error rate p+. For decoding, they prepare
a set {s(2)[s] }[s]∈FMs,12 /C1 of representatives for respective cosets [s] ∈ F
Ms,1
2 /C1. They
also prepare another set {s(1)[s] }[s]∈FMs,12 /C1 of representatives for respective cosets
[s] ∈ FMs,12 /C1. Then, they exchange their information FMs,12 /C⊥2 . Alice obtains
x := s− s(1)[s] in C⊥2 , and Bob obtains x′ := s′ − s(1)[s] − s(2)[s′−s] in C1.
(6) Privacy amplification: Using the method explained latter, Alice and Bob define
the sacrifice bit-length S in the privacy amplification from Ns,1, N0, N1, N2,
Ms,1,M0,M1,M2,M3. Then, they apply ε-almost dual universal2 hash function
from C1 ∼= Fl2 to Fl−S2 [26]. Then, they obtain the final keys.
(7) Error verification: Alice and Bob apply a suitable hash function to the final
keys. They exchange the exclusive OR between the above hash value and other
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prepared secret keys. If the above exclusive OR agrees, their keys agree with a high
probability[40, 41].
Table 1. Transmitted pluses
Alice’s basis Bob’s basis vacuum µ1 µ2
bit basis
bit basis
N0
Ns,1 Ns,2
@@@@@@@@@@@ phase basis
phase basis
bit basis
phase basis N1 N2
Table 2. Detected pluses
Alice’s basis Bob’s basis vacuum µ1 µ2
bit basis
bit basis
M0
Ms,1 Ms,2
@@@@@@@@@@@ phase basis
phase basis
bit basis @@ @@@
phase basis
correct M1 M2
incorrect M3 M4
In the error correction, we lose more thanMs,1h(p+) bits. When we lose ηMs,1h(p+)
bits in the error correction, the final key length is Ms,1 − ηMs,1h(p+)− S. In a realistic
case, we choose η to be 1.1. In the above protocol, it is possible to restrict the intensity
to generate the raw keys to µ1 or µ2. In this case, we restrict the intensity with the bit
basis to µ1 or µ2. When we restrict the intensity with the bit basis to µ2, the numbers
Ns,1 and Ms,1 become 0.
In the following discussion, we denote the number of transmitted pulses for
generation of raw keys, the number of raw keys, and the signal intensity by Ns, Ms, and
µs. That is, when we discuss the security of final keys generated from raw keys with the
intensity µi, the numbers Ns, Ms, and µs are chosen to be Ns,i, Ms,i, and µi for i = 1, 2.
Remark 1 In the above protocol, the raw keys are generated from the bit basis.
However, this assumption is not essential. For example, our analysis can be applied
to the case when the raw keys are generated from both bases as follows. First, we replace
Step (3) by the following Step (3’).
(3’) Verification of basis: Using the public channel, Alice sends Bob all information
with respect to the basis and the intensity for all pulses. Using the public channel,
Bob informs Alice what pulses has the matched basis. Then, as is illustrated in
Table 1, they decide the numbers N0, N
′
1, N
′
2, N
′
s,1 and N
′
s,2 as follows. N
′
0 is the
number of vacuum pulses, N ′1 is the number of µ1-intensity pulses with the phase
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basis in the both sides, N ′2 is the number of µ2-intensity pulses with the phase basis
in the both sides, N ′s,1 is the number of µ1-intensity pulses with the bit basis in the
both sides, and N ′s,2 is the number of µ2-intensity pulses with the bit basis in the
both sides.
Then, we decide smaller numbers N1, N2, Ns,1, Ns,2 than N
′
1, N
′
2, N
′
s,1, N
′
s,2,
respectively. Next, we randomly choose N1, N2, Ns,1, Ns,2 pulses among N
′
1, N
′
2,
N ′s,1, N
′
s,2 pulses, respectively.
After Step (7), we choose numbers Ns,1, Ns,2, N1, N2 to be N
′
1 − N1, N ′2 − N2,
N ′s,1 − Ns,1, N ′s,2 − Ns,2, respectively. We apply Step (4) and the following steps to the
remaining Ns,1+Ns,2+N1+N2 pulses and N0 vacuum pulses with exchanging the roles
of the bit and the phase bases. In this case, we may choose the classical error correcting
code C based on the observed error rate in Step (5).
Remark 2 When the receiver uses the threshold detector, in Step (2) (Detection), the
receiver might detect the both events. In this case, we use the following type detector
[48].
Detector When the receiver detects the both events, the receiver chooses 0 as the bit
value definitely.
In fact, since the encoding does not depend on the choice of the detector, the formula
(2) holds with the averaged virtual decoding phase error probability Pph based on any
Bob’s virtual decoder employing any Bob’s detector when Bob’s detection event does not
depend on the choice of the basis. Hence, our security analysis is still valid even in the
above detector.
4. Description of Eve
In the following, we describe the strategy of Eve. For this purpose, we treat only the
vacuum pulses and the pulses with matched bases, i.e., N0 +N1 +N2 +Ns pulses given
in Table 1. We do not treat other kinds of pulses. Eve cannot distinguish pulses with
the intensities µ1 and µ2 perfectly. Alternatively, we assume that Eve can choose her
strategy depending on the number of photons because she can distinguish the number
of photons. That is, Eve is assumed to be able to distinguish the states |0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|,
ρ2, and ρ3.
We assume the following partition of pulses given in Table 1 as follows:
• There are N (0)1 pulses with the vacuum state and N (1)1 pulses with the single-photon
state among N1 µ1-intensity pulses with the phase basis.
• There are N (0)2 pulses with the vacuum state, N (1)2 pulses with the single-photon
state, and N
(2)
2 pulses with the state ρ2 among N2 µ2-intensity pulses with the phase
basis.
• There are N (0)s pulses with the vacuum state and N (1)s pulses with the single-photon
state among Ns µs-intensity pulses with the bit basis.
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For a simplicity, we employ the notations Ns := (N
(0)
s , N
(1)
s , N
(2)
s ), N1 :=
(N
(0)
1 , N
(1)
1 ), N2 := (N
(0)
2 , N
(1)
2 , N
(2)
2 ), and
~N := (N1,N2). In the above partition,
there are N0+N
(0)
1 +N
(0)
2 +N
(0)
s pulses with the vacuum state, N
(1)
1 +N
(1)
2 +N
(1)
s pulses
with the single-photon state, N
(2)
1 +N
(2)
2 pulses with the state ρ2 and the phase basis,
and N
(3)
2 pulses with the state ρ3 and the phase basis, where N
(2)
1 := N1 −N (0)1 −N (1)1
and N
(3)
2 := N2 − N (0)2 − N (1)2 − N (2)2 . Note that the average state with the bit basis is
not the same as the average state with the phase basis in the case of the multi-photon
state.
Then, Eve is assumed to be able to control the detection rates q¯(0), q¯(1), q¯
(2)
× , and
q¯
(3)
× in Bob’s side among N0 + N
(0)
1 + N
(0)
2 + N
(0)
s vacuum pulses, N
(1)
1 + N
(1)
2 + N
(1)
s
single-photon pulses, N
(2)
1 + N
(2)
2 pulses of the state ρ2 with the phase basis, and
N
(3)
2 pulses of the state ρ3 with the phase basis, respectively. Similarly, Eve is
assumed to be able to control the phase-error detection rates b¯
(1)
× , b¯
(2)
× , and b¯
(3)
× in
Bob’s side among N
(1)
1 + N
(1)
2 + N
(1)
s single-photon pulses, N
(2)
1 + N
(2)
2 pulses of the
state ρ2 with the phase basis, and N
(3)
2 pulses of the state ρ3 with the phase basis,
respectively. In the following discussion, we use the parameters a¯
(1)
× := q¯
(1) − b¯(1)× ,
a¯
(2)
× := q¯
(2)
× − b¯(2)× , a¯(3)× := q¯(3)× − b¯(3)× , instead of q¯(1), q¯(2)× , q¯(3)× . For a simplicity,
we employ the notations a¯ := (a¯
(1)
× , a¯
(2)
× , a¯
(3)
× ) and b¯ := (b¯
(1)
× , b¯
(2)
× , b¯
(3)
× ). Eve is also
assumed to be able to control the parameters q¯(0), a¯ and b¯ dependently on the partition
of the total N0 + N1 + N2 + Ns pulses. Further, Eve is assumed to choose these
values stochastically. Hence, the joint distribution conditioned with ~N and Ns can
be written as Qe(q¯
(0), a¯, b¯| ~N ,Ns). Since our analysis depends only on ~N , we use the
conditional distribution Qe(q¯
(0), a¯, b¯| ~N) := ∑
Ns
Ps(Ns)Qe(q¯
(0), a¯, b¯| ~N ,Ns), where Ps
is the distribution of Ns and cannot be controlled by Eve.
5. Formulas of sacrifice bit-length
5.1. Non-improved formula
The aim of this section is to give formulas of the sacrifice bit-length S satisfying
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ 2−β (15)
as a function of β, µs, µ1, µ2, Ns, N0, N1, N2, and M , where ρA,E is the final state and
ρideal is the ideal state. This section gives two formulas, the non-improved formula and
the improved formula. While the improved formula gives a shorter sacrifice bit-length
than the non-improved formula, the non-improved formula is simpler than the improved
formula. Hence, we give the non-improved formula firstly. In the next subsection, we
give the improved formula. For this purpose, we prepare fundamental definition for
behavior of random variables.
Definition 1 When the random variable k is subject to the distribution P , we denote
k ∼ P . When the true distribution is the N-trial binary distribution with success
probability p, which is denoted by Bin(N, p), we denote the upper percent point with
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probability α by X+per(N, p, α), and denote the lower percent point with probability α by
X−per(N, p, α). Then, we define p
+
per(N, p, α) := X
+
per(N, p, α)/N , and p
−
per(N, p, α) :=
X−per(N, p, α)/N . When we observe the value k subject to the binomial distribution
Bin(N, p) with N trials and probability p, we denote the lower confidence limit of the
lower one-sided interval estimation with the confidential level 1 − α by p−est(N, k, α).
Similarly, we denote the upper confidence limit of the upper one-sided interval estimation
with the confidential level 1 − α by p+est(N, k, α). Then, we define X−est(N, k, α) :=
p−est(N, k, α)N , and X
+
est(N, k, α) := p
+
est(N, k, α)N .
When N is not so large (e.g., 10,000) or α is not so small (e.g., 0.001), the
percent pointX±per(N, p, α) can be calculated by mathematical package in software (e.g.,
Mathematica). As is summarized in Appendix B.1, the interval estimation p±est(N, k, α)
is described by F distribution, and can be calculated by mathematical package in
software in this case, similarly. However, when N is too large and α is too small, these
calculation cannot be done by a usual mathematical package in software. However, since
N is large enough, using formulas given in Appendices A and B, we can calculate good
lower and upper bounds of these values, which is enough close to the exact values for our
purpose. The calculation formulas can be implemented with small calculation amounts.
Indeed, in order to guarantee the unconditional security, we have to use the
hypergeometric distribution instead of the binomial distribution. However, the
hypergeometric distribution can be partially replaced by the binomial distribution.
Section 7 explains which case allows this replacement. This replacement greatly
simplifies the calculation of sacrifice bit-length.
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Figure 2. Outline of our derivation of the sacrifice bit-length S.
Now, we give the non-improved formula of the sacrifice bit-length S as a function
of β, µs, µ1, µ2, Ns, N0, N1, N2, and M = (Ms,M0,M1,M2,M3). The whole structure
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of our formulas is summarized as Fig. 2. Then, as is shown latter, when the sacrifice
bit-length is given by the following way, the final key satisfies (15).
Step (1) We estimate the detection rates of decoy pulses from the observed data based
on interval estimation:
Mˆ0 := X
−
est(N0,M0, 2
−2β−8), (16)
Mˆ1 := X
−
est(N1,M1, 2
−2β−8), (17)
Mˆ2 := X
+
est(N2,M2, 2
−2β−8), (18)
Mˆ3 := X
+
est(N1,M3, 2
−2β−8). (19)
Step (2) We estimate the partitions of several kinds of transmitted pulses by using
percent points:
Nˆ
(0)
1 := X
−
per(N1, e
−µ1 , 2−2β−8) (20)
Nˆ
(1)
1 := X
−
per(N1, µ1e
−µ1 , 2−2β−8) (21)
Nˆ
(0)
2 := X
−
per(N2, e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8) (22)
Nˆ
(1)
2 := X
−
per(N2, µ2e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8) (23)
Nˆ
(2)
2 := X
−
per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8). (24)
Step (3) We estimate the channel parameters from the partitions and the detection
rates of several kinds of transmitted pulses by solving joint inequalities:
qˆ(0)(Mˆ0) :=
Mˆ0
N0
(25)
aˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ ,
~ˆ
N) :=
[
N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ(0)(Mˆ0)Nˆ (0)1 /2)− Nˆ (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)(Mˆ0)Nˆ (0)2 /2)
Nˆ
(1)
1 Nˆ
(2)
2 − Nˆ (1)2 Nˆ (2)1
]
+
(26)
bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ ,
~ˆ
N) :=
[
Mˆ3 − 12 qˆ(0)(Mˆ0)Nˆ
(0)
1
Nˆ
(1)
1
]
+
, (27)
where [x]+ := max(x, 0).
Step (4) We estimate the partition of detected pulses of raw keys from the channel
parameters by using percent points:
Jˆ (0) := X−per(Ns, e
−µs qˆ(0), 2−2β−8) (28)
Jˆ (1) := X−per(Ns, e
−µsµs(aˆ
(1)
× + bˆ
(1)
× ), 2
−2β−8) (29)
rˆ
(1)
× := p
+
per
(
Jˆ (1),
bˆ
(1)
×
aˆ
(1)
× + bˆ
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)
. (30)
Step (5) We estimate the leaked information from the partition of detected pulses of
raw keys by using the relation between the phase error and the security:
φˆ2 := Ms − Jˆ (0) − Jˆ (1)(1− h(min{rˆ(1)× , 1/2})). (31)
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Step (6) We give the sacrifice bit-length from the leaked information:
S :=
{
φˆ2 + 2β + 5 if Conditions 1, 2 and 3 below hold.
dimC1 otherwise.
(32)
That is, when one of Conditions 1, 2 and 3 does not hold, we abort the protocol.
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 are given as follows. In order to give these conditions, we
define the set Ω1 as the set of ~N satisfying
N
(0)
1 ∈ [X−per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−2β−8), X+per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−2β−8)] (33)
N
(1)
1 ∈ [X−per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−2β−8), X+per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−2β−8)] (34)
N
(0)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2, e−µ2 , 2−2β−8), X+per(N2, e−µ2 , 2−2β−8)] (35)
N
(1)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2, µ2e−µ2 , 2−2β−8), X+per(N2, µ2e−µ2 , 2−2β−8)] (36)
N
(2)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2, ω2µ22e−µ2 , 2−2β−8), X+per(N2, ω2µ22e−µ2 , 2−2β−8)]. (37)
Condition 1 Any element ~N ∈ Ω1 satisfies
X−per(N1, µ1e
−µ1 , 2−2β−8)X−per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8)
> (N1 −X−per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−2β−8)−X−per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−2β−8))X+per(N2, µ2e−µ2 , 2−2β−8),
X−per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8)X−per(N1, e
−µ1 , 2−2β−8)
> (N1 −X−per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−2β−8)−X−per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−2β−8))X+per(N2, e−µ2 , 2−2β−8),
X−per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8)
N1 −X−per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−2β−8)−X−per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−2β−8)
+
X−per(N2, e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8)
X+per(N1, e
−µ1 , 2−2β−8)
>
2X+per(N2, µ2e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8)
X−per(N1, µ1e
−µ1 , 2−2β−8)
.
Condition 2 For any ~N ∈ Ω1, all of the following values are positive.
A
(0)
1 := Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)(N (0)2 +N (2)2 )/2−N (1)2
N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ(0)N (0)1 /2)−N (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)N (0)2 /2)
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
,
A
(1)
1 := Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)N (0)2 /2− (N (2)2 +N (1)2 )
N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ(0)N (0)1 /2)−N (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)N (0)2 /2)
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
,
A
(1)
2 :=
N
(2)
1 (N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ
(0)
2
N
(0)
1 )−N (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ
(0)
2
N
(0)
2 ))
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
,
A
(2)
2 := Mˆ1 −
qˆ(0)
2
N
(0)
1 −
N
(1)
1 (N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ
(0)
2
N
(0)
1 )−N (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ
(0)
2
N
(0)
2 ))
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
B
(1)
1 := Mˆ3 − qˆ(0)N (0)1 /2.
Condition 3 Any element ~N ∈ Ω1 satisfies
bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , ~N)
aˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , ~N) + bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , ~N)
≤ 1
8
. (38)
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Remark 3 (Adjustment of qˆ(0) for non-improved formula) When the vacuum
pulse has a possibility to contain a non-vacuum state, we cannot apply the above formula
qˆ(0). Hence, we need its adjustment. Assume that the vacuum pulse becomes a non-
vacuum state with a probability q. In this case, we replace qˆ(0) by
qˆ(0)(M0) := p
+
est(N0 −X+per(N0, q, 2−2β−8),M0 −X+per(N0, q, 2−2β−8), 2−2β−8). (39)
Here, we should remark that Condition 1 is given for the initial parameters
β, µ1, µ2, N1, N2 while Conditions 2 and 3 are given for the observed values M =
(Ms,M0,M1,M2,M3) as well as the initial parameters β, µ1, µ2, N0, N1, N2. Hence,
it is required to choose the initial parameters β, µ1, µ2, N1, N2 satisfying Condition 1.
Further, we need to choose the initial parameters β, µ1, µ2, N0, N1, N2 so that Conditions
2 and 3 hold with high probability.
Now, we consider the case when there might exist an eavesdropper. In this case,
even if we choose µ1, µ2, N0, N1, N2 suitably, the eavesdropper might control the channel
parameters q¯(0), a¯ and b¯ so that Conditions 2 and 3 do not hold. Hence, we need to
prepare a method to smoothly decide whether Conditions 2 and 3 hold.
We will show that the non-improved formula satisfies the condition (15) in Sections
8, 9, and 10. The following table (Table 3) explains which equations in Sections 8, 9,
and 10 correspond to the above steps in the non-improved formula.
Table 3. Detail descriptions of respective steps
Step Subsection Equation
Step (1) 9.3 (137), (138), (139), (140)
Step (2) 10.2 (145), (146), (147), (148), (149)
Step (3) 9.2 (114), (116), (120)
Step (4) 9.1 (99), (100), (103)
Step (5) 9.2 (121)
Step (6) 10.2 (152)
Adjustment 9.3 (143) (Remark 7)
5.2. Improved formula
However, the above construction is too restrictive. We can replace Steps (1), (2), (4),
Condition 1, and the definition of the set Ω1 as follows. That is, Conditions 2 and 3
are replaced by the conditions based on the improved version of Ω. The formula given
here for the sacrifice bit-length is called the improved formula. Section 11 explains why
the improvement is possible. That is, Section 11 shows that the improved formula also
guarantees the condition (15).
Step (1) We replace the estimated detection rates of decoy pulses by the following way:
Mˆ0 := X
−
est(N0,M0, 2
−β−6), (40)
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Mˆ1 := X
−
est(N1,M1, 2
−2β−7), (41)
Mˆ2 := X
+
est(N2,M2, 2
−2β−7), (42)
Mˆ3 := X
+
est(N1,M3, 2
−2β−7). (43)
Step (2) We replace the estimated partitions of several kinds of transmitted pulses by
the following way:
Nˆ
(0)
1 := X
−
per(N1, e
−µ1 , 2−β−6) (44)
Nˆ
(1)
1 := X
−
per(N1, µ1e
−µ1 , 2−β−6) (45)
Nˆ
(0)
2 := X
−
per(N2, e
−µ2 , 2−β−6) (46)
Nˆ
(1)
2 := X
−
per(N2, µ2e
−µ2 , 2−β−6) (47)
Nˆ
(2)
2 := X
−
per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−β−6). (48)
Step (4) We replace the estimated partition of detected pulses and the estimated phase
error rate of the single photon of raw keys by the following way:
Jˆ (0) := X−per(Ns, e
−µs qˆ(0), 2−β−6) (49)
Jˆ (1) := X−per(Ns, e
−µsµs(aˆ
(1)
× + bˆ
(1)
× ), 2
−β−6) (50)
rˆ
(1)
× := p
+
per
(
Jˆ (1),
bˆ
(1)
×
aˆ
(1)
× + bˆ
(1)
×
, 2−2β−7
)
. (51)
The definition of the set Ω1 is replaced as the set of ~N satisfying
N
(0)
1 ∈ [X−per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−β−6), X+per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−β−6)] (52)
N
(1)
1 ∈ [X−per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−β−6), X+per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−β−6)] (53)
N
(0)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2, e−µ2 , 2−β−6), X+per(N2, e−µ2 , 2−β−6)] (54)
N
(1)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2, µ2e−µ2 , 2−β−6), X+per(N2, µ2e−µ2 , 2−β−6)] (55)
N
(2)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2, ω2µ22e−µ2 , 2−β−6), X+per(N2, ω2µ22e−µ2 , 2−β−6)]. (56)
Condition 1 is replaced as follows.
Condition 1 Any element ~N ∈ Ω1 satisfies
X−per(N1, µ1e
−µ1 , 2−β−6)X−per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−β−6)
> (N1 −X−per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−β−6)−X−per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−β−6))X+per(N2, µ2e−µ2 , 2−β−6),
X−per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−β−6)X−per(N1, e
−µ1 , 2−β−6)
> (N1 −X−per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−β−6)−X−per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−β−6))X+per(N2, e−µ2 , 2−β−6),
X−per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−β−6)
N1 −X−per(N1, e−µ1 , 2−β−6)−X−per(N1, µ1e−µ1 , 2−β−6)
+
X−per(N2, e
−µ2 , 2−β−6)
X+per(N1, e
−µ1 , 2−β−6)
>
2X+per(N2, µ2e
−µ2 , 2−β−6)
X−per(N1, µ1e
−µ1 , 2−β−6)
.
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Remark 4 (Adjustment of qˆ(0) for improved formula) When the vacuum pulse
has a possibility to contain a non-vacuum state, we cannot apply the above formula qˆ(0).
Hence, we need its adjustment. Assume that the vacuum pulse becomes a non-vacuum
state with a probability q. In this case, we replace qˆ(0) by
qˆ(0)(M0) := p
+
est(N0 −X+per(N0, q, 2−β−6),M0 −X+per(N0, q, 2−β−6), 2−β−6). (57)
5.3. Numerical analysis
Next, we treat numerical analysis with the improved formula of the sacrifice-bit length.
In the following, we consider only the case when the perfect vacuum state is available
and the signal intensity is µ2, the decoy intensity is µ1, i.e., µs = µ2, Ns = Ns,2,
and Ms = Ms,2. This is because this case is better than the opposite case in the
asymptotic case as is shown in the paper [50]. We also choose the parameters as
N0 = N1 = N2 = Ns,2/10, and β = 80, i.e., the trace norm is less than 2
−80.
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Figure 3. The above graphs
describe the key generation rate
R2,f given in (61) as functions of
the signal intensity µ2 when the
decoy intensity µ1 is 0.1. The pink
line is the case when the bit-length
of raw keysMs,2 is 10
6. The orange
line is the case withMs,2 = 2×106.
The red line is the case withMs,2 =
3× 106. The green line is the case
with Ms,2 = 5 × 106. The purple
line is the case with Ms,2 = 10
7.
The yellow line is the case with
Ms,2 = 10
8. The blue line is the
asymptotic case.
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Figure 4. The above graphs
describe the key generation rate
R2,f given in (61) as functions of
the bit-length of raw keys Ms,2
when the signal intensity µ2 is 0.5.
The orange line is the case when
the decoy intensity µ1 is 0.01. The
red line is the case with µ1 = 0.05.
The purple line is the case with
µ1 = 0.1. The yellow line is the
case with µ1 = 0.15. The pink line
is the case with µ1 = 0.2. The blue
line is the case with µ1 = 0.25.
It is natural to assume that the measured values M0, M1, M2, M3, and Ns,2 are
given as functions of Ms,2 in the following way
M0 = p0N0, M1 = (p1,× − s1,×)N1 (58)
M2 = (p2,× − s2,×)N2, M3 = s1,×N1, Ns,2 = Ms,2/p2,+. (59)
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Figure 5. The above graphs describe the key generation rate R2,f given in (61) as
functions of the signal intensity µ2 when the bit-length of raw keys Ms,2 is 10
7. The
orange line is the case when the decoy intensity µ1 is 0.01. The red line is the case
with µ1 = 0.05. The purple line is the case with µ1 = 0.1. The yellow line is the case
with µ1 = 0.15. The pink line is the case with µ1 = 0.2. The blue line is the case with
µ1 = 0.25. The green line is the asymptotic case with µ1 → 0.
We also assume that the channel parameters, i.e., the detection rates pi,× and pi,+ of
µi-intensity pulses with the bases × and + and the rates si,× and si,+ of the detected
µi-intensity pulses having phase error to the transmitted µi-intensity pulses with the
bases × and + as follows [51, 52].
pi,+ = pi,× = 1− e−αµi + p0,
si,+ = si,× = s(1− e−αµi) + p0
2
, (60)
where α is the total transmission including quantum efficiency of the detector, and s
is the error due to the imperfection of the optical system. In the following, we choose
α = 1.0 × 10−3, p0 = 4.0 × 10−7, s = 0.03. Then, we consider the key generation rate
with finite-length:
R2,f :=
Ms,2 − S − ηh( s1,+p1,+ )Ms,2
Ns,2
, (61)
where S is the sacrifice bit-length and η = 1.1.
Since the required value 2−80 is too small and the sizes N0, N1, N2,Ms are too large,
the exact calculations of the valuesX±per(N, p, α),X
±
est(N, k, α), and p
±
est(N, k, α) spend
too much time. So, instead of the exact calculation, we employ the bounds of these
values based on Chernoff bound, which require a smaller amount of calculations and
are summarized in Appendices A and B. Indeed, when N is large enough, the exact
values of X±per(N, p, α), X
±
est(N, k, α), and p
±
est(N, k, α) are close to the values based
on Chernoff bound sufficiently for our purpose because the difference between the exact
values X±per(N, p, α), X
±
est(N, k, α) and their values based on Chernoff bound behaves
with the order logN .
As is illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4 with µ1 = 0.1, α = 1/1000, p0 = 0.0000004,
η = 1.1, the key generation rate is close to the asymptotic key generation rate R2(µ1, µ2)
when the length of the code Ms,2 is increasing. As is shown in [50], the asymptotic key
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generation rate is monotonically decreasing with respect to µ1. However, as is illustrated
in Fig. 5 with α = 1/1000, p0 = 0.0000004, η = 1.1, the key generation rate is not
monotonically decreasing with respect to µ1 when the length of the code Ms,2 is not
sufficiently large. That is, too small µ1 does not give a good key generation rate. This
is because smaller µ1 yields a larger estimation error.
6. Sacrifice bit-length when the intensities are not fixed with the
finite-length case
6.1. Derivation of modified formula
Unfortunately, many realized quantum key distribution systems have fluctuation for
the intensities. The formulas of the secure sacrifice bit-length given in Section 5
can guarantee the security (15) when the partitions of N1 pulses and N2 pulses obey
the Poisson distribution with a fixed intensity. However, when the intensities have
fluctuation, we have to derive the sacrifice bit-length by taking into account this factor.
That is, we need to discuss the distribution for ~N in the different way. In this section,
we discuss the sacrifice bit-length by taking into account the statistical fluctuation for
the intensities. Since the definition of ρ2 given in (10) depends on the intensity µ1, we
need to modify the definition of ρ2 properly.
6.1.1. Modifications of ρ2, ρ3, ω2, and ω3 In the following, we assume that the
intensities µ1 and µ2 independently obey independent and identical distributions of
the distributions P1 and P2 satisfying the following condition. For any integer n ≥ 3,
the relation
E[e−µ2µn2 ]E[e
−µ1µ21] ≥ E[e−µ1µn1 ]E[e−µ2µ22]
holds, where E denotes the expectation under the distributions P1 and P2. Under the
above assumption, we have expansions for two kinds of pulses.
∞∑
n=0
E[e−µ1µn1 ]
n!
|n〉〈n| = E[e−µ1 ]|0〉〈0|+ E[e−µ1µ1]|1〉〈1|+ E[e−µ1µ21]ω2ρ2, (62)
∞∑
n=0
E[e−µ2µn2 ]
n!
|n〉〈n| = E[e−µ2 ]|0〉〈0|+ E[e−µ2µ2]|1〉〈1|+ E[e−µ2µ22]ω2ρ2 + ω′3ρ3, (63)
where
ρ2 :=
1
ω2
∞∑
n=2
E[e−µ1µn1 ]
n!E[e−µ1µ21]
|n〉〈n| (64)
ρ3 :=
1
ω′3
∞∑
n=3
E[e−µ2µn2 ]E[e
−µ1µ21]− E[e−µ1µn1 ]E[e−µ2µ22]
n!E[e−µ1µ21]
|n〉〈n| (65)
ω2 :=
∞∑
n=2
E[e−µ1µn1 ]
n!E[e−µ1µ21]
(66)
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ω′3 :=
∞∑
n=3
E[e−µ2µn2 ]E[e
−µ1µ21]− E[e−µ1µn1 ]E[e−µ2µ22]
n!E[e−µ1µ21]
. (67)
Indeed, our analysis in the previous sections uses the expansions (10) and (13) and their
coefficients. Hence, replacing expansions (10) and (13) by expansions (62) and (63), we
can apply the discussion with suitable modifications in the following way. (A similar
idea was used in Wang [15, 16].)
6.1.2. Modifications of the set Ω1 and the estimate Nˆ1 and Nˆ2 We redefine the set Ω1
as the set of ~N satisfying
N
(0)
1 ∈ [X−per(N1,E[e−µ1 ], 2−β−6), X+per(N1,E[e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)]
N
(1)
1 ∈ [X−per(N1,E[µ1e−µ1 ], 2−β−6), X+per(N1,E[µ1e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)]
N
(0)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2,E[e−µ2 ], 2−β−6), X+per(N2,E[e−µ2 ], 2−β−6)]
N
(1)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2,E[µ2e−µ2 ], 2−β−6), X+per(N2,E[µ2e−µ2 ], 2−β−6)]
N
(2)
2 ∈ [X−per(N2,E[e−µ2µ22]ω2, 2−β−6), X+per(N2,E[e−µ2µ22]ω2, 2−β−6)].
We also redefine Nˆ1 and Nˆ2 in the following way.
Nˆ
(0)
1 := X
−
per(N1,E[e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
Nˆ
(1)
1 := X
−
per(N1,E[µ1e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
Nˆ
(0)
2 := X
−
per(N2,E[e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
Nˆ
(1)
2 := X
−
per(N2,E[µ2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
Nˆ
(2)
2 := X
−
per(N2,E[e
−µ2µ22]ω2, 2
−β−6).
6.1.3. Modifications of Conditions 1, 2, and 3 Under the above modification, we
change Condition 1 as follows.
Condition 1 Any element ~N in the modified set Ω1 satisfies
X−per(N1,E[µ1e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)X−per(N2, ω2E[µ
2
2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
> (N1 −X−per(N1,E[e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)−X−per(N1,E[µ1e−µ1 ], 2−β−6))X+per(N2,E[µ2e−µ2 ], 2−β−6),
X−per(N2, ω2E[µ
2
2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)X−per(N,E[e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
> (N1 −X−per(N1,E[e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)−X−per(N1,E[µ1e−µ1 ], 2−β−6))X+per(N2,E[e−µ2 ], 2−β−6),
X−per(N2, ω2E[µ
2
2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
N1 −X−per(N1,E[e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)−X−per(N1,E[µ1e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
+
X−per(N2,E[e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
X+per(N1,E[e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
>
2X+per(N2,E[µ2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
X−per(N1,E[µ1e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
.
Conditions 2 and 3 are redefined in the term of Ω1 defined above.
Condition 2 For any element ~N in the modified set Ω1, all of A
(0)
1 , A
(1)
1 , A
(0)
2 , A
(1)
2 ,
and A
(2)
2 are negative.
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Condition 3 Any element ~N in the modified set Ω1 satisfies the conditions in original
Condition 3.
6.1.4. Modifications of sacrifice bit-length S Next, in order to modify the sacrifice
bit-length S, we modify Jˆ (0), Jˆ (1), rˆ
(1)
× , and φˆ1 as follows.
Jˆ (0)(q¯(0), Ns) := X
−
per(Ns,E[e
−µs ]q¯(0), 2−2β−8)
Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns) := X
−
per(Ns,E[e
−µsµs](a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
× ), 2
−2β−8)
rˆ
(1)
× (a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns) := p
+
per(Jˆ
(1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8)
φˆ1(q¯
(0), a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns) := Ms − Jˆ (0)(q¯(0), Ns)
− Jˆ (1)(a¯(1)× , b¯(1)× , Ns)(1− h(min{rˆ(1)× (a¯(1)× , b¯(1)× , Ns), 1/2})).
Then, using the same functions qˆ(0), aˆ
(1)
× , and bˆ
(1)
× , we define φˆ2 by (31).
Finally, we define the sacrifice bit-length S by (32) with modified Conditions 1, 2,
and 3. Then, the relation (15) holds. This fact can be shown by replacing the definitions
of ρ2 and ρ3 and related parameters in the security proofs given in Sections 8 - 11.
6.1.5. Extension to Case when the distributions of µ2 and µ1 are unknown Next, we
treat the case when there are several candidates for the distribution of µ2 and µ1 while
µ2 and µ1 obey independent and identical distributions. The possible distributions is
denoted by Pθ,1 and Pθ,2, and the expectation is written by Eθ. Then, we denote the set
Ω1 under the distribution Pθ by Ω1,θ.
In this case, Conditions 1 and 2 are needed to be satisfied for any θ. Hence,
Condition 1 is redefined as follows. That is, the following relations hold for any θ.
X−per(N1,Eθ[µ1e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)X−per(N2, ω2|θEθ[µ
2
2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
> (N1 −X−per(N1,Eθ[e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)−X−per(N1,Eθ[µ1e−µ1 ], 2−β−6))X+per(N2,Eθ[µ2e−µ2 ], 2−β−6),
X−per(N2, ω2|θEθ[µ
2
2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)X−per(N,Eθ[e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
> (N1 −X−per(N1,Eθ[e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)−X−per(N1,Eθ[µ1e−µ1 ], 2−β−6))X+per(N2,Eθ[e−µ2 ], 2−β−6),
X−per(N2, ω2|θEθ[µ
2
2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
N1 −X−per(N1,Eθ[e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)−X−per(N1,Eθ[µ1e−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
+
X−per(N2,Eθ[e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
X+per(N1,Eθ[e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
>
2X+per(N2,Eθ[µ2e
−µ2 ], 2−β−6)
X−per(N1,Eθ[µ1e
−µ1 ], 2−β−6)
,
where ω2|θ is ω2 with the distribution Pθ,1.
Further, we redefine Condition 2 as the condition that all of A
(0)
1 , A
(1)
1 , A
(0)
2 , A
(1)
2 ,
and A
(2)
2 are negative for
~N ∈ ∪θΩ1,θ. We define φˆ2,θ to be φˆ2 given in (31) when
the true distributions are Pθ,1 and Pθ,2. Finally, we define the sacrifice bit-length S by
supθ φˆ2,θ+2β+5 when modified Conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Otherwise, we set S to be
dimC1. Then, letting ρA,E|θ be the final state with the true distributions Pθ,1 and Pθ,2,
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ρideal |θ be the ideal state, we obtain
‖ρA,E|θ − ρideal |θ‖1 ≤ 2−β. (68)
That is, the inequality holds for any θ.
In the following, we consider the case when the pulses are generated with the
mixture of the plural independent and identical distributions Pθ,1 and Pθ,2, respectively.
In this case, we define Conditions 1, 2, and 3 in the above way. Then, the intensities of
Ns,1+N1 pulses are described by (µ1,1, . . . , µ1,Ns,1+N1) and are subject to the distribution∑
θ λθP
×(Ns,1+N1)
θ,1 , where P
×Ns,1 is the Ns,1-fold independent and identical distribution
of P . Similarly, the intensities of Ns,2+N2 pulses are described by (µ2,1, . . . , µ2,Ns,2+N2)
and are subject to the distribution
∑
θ λθP
×(Ns,2+N2)
θ,2 . Then, we choose the sacrifice
bit-length S to be supθ φˆ2,θ(M) + 2β + 5 when modified Conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Otherwise, we set S to be dimC1. Since the final state is
∑
θ λθρA,E|θ, we obtain
‖(
∑
θ
λθρA,E|θ)− (
∑
θ
λθρideal |θ)‖1 ≤
∑
θ
λθ‖ρA,E|θ − ρideal |θ‖1 ≤ 2−β. (69)
Hence, the universal composability criterion is upper bounded by 2−β.
6.2. Numerical analysis with Gaussian distribution
Next, we treat numerical analysis when two intensities µ1 and µ2 independently and
identically obey the Gaussian distributions with the averages µ¯1 and µ¯2 and the standard
deviations µ¯1t and µ¯2t, respectively because these fluctuations usually are caused by the
thermal noise. That is, we assume the value t is independent of the intensity. This
assumption holds, if the weak pulses are obtained from strong light pulses with a well-
calibrated attenuator; the error originates mainly from the intensity fluctuation of the
light source. In the following, we consider only the case when the signal intensity is µ2,
the decoy intensity is µ1, i.e., µs = µ2, Ns = Ns,2, and Ms = Ms,2. We also choose the
parameters as N0 = N1 = N2 = Ns,2/10, and β = 80, i.e., the trace norm is less than
2−80.
In order to calculate the sacrifice bit-length given above, we need E[eµi ], E[µie
µi ],
E[µ2i e
µi ], and ω2, which can be easily calculated from the formulas given in Appendix
D. In this case, due to (C.6), it is natural to assume that the measured values M0, M1,
M2, and M3 are given by (58) and (59) when pi,+, pi,×, si,+, and si,× are given as
pi,+ = pi,× = 1− E[e−αµi ] + p0 = 1− e
2αµ¯i−α
2t2µ¯1
2
2 + p0 (70)
si,+ = si,× = s(1− E[e−αµi ]) + p0
2
= s(1− e 2αµ¯i−α
2t2µ¯1
2
2 ) +
p0
2
. (71)
Hence, we choose Ns,2 to beMs,2/p2,+. Under this assumption, substituting the sacrifice
bit-length given above into the key generation rate Rf,2 given in (61), we obtain the
numerical calculation in Figs. 6 and 7. These numerical results suggest that when the
variance is less than 10% of the average, the fluctuations of intensities do not cause
serious decrease of the key generation rate. Here, similar to Subsection 5.3, Here,
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Figure 6. All graphs give the key
generation rates R2,f when the bit-
length of raw keys Ms,2 is 10
7 and
the decoy intensity µ1 is 0.1 and
is smaller than the signal intensity
µ2. The horizontal axis describes
the signal intensity µ2. The green
line is the rate R2,f with t = 0%.
The blue line is the rate R2,f with
t = 10%. The red line is the rate
R2,f with t = 30%.
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Figure 7. All graphs give the
key generation rate R2,f with the
bit-length of raw keys Ms,2 = 10
6
when the decoy intensity µ1 is
0.1 and is smaller than the signal
intensity µ2. The horizontal axis
describes the signal intensity µ2.
The green line is the rate R2,f with
t = 0%. The blue line is the rate
R2,f with t = 10%. The red line is
the rate R2,f with t = 30%.
similar to Subsection 5.3, we employ the bounds of X±per(N, p, α), X
±
est(N, k, α), and
p±est(N, k, α) given in Appendices A and B.
7. Preparation for behavior of random variables
In this section, we explain that we can use the binomial distribution even when the
true distribution is the hypergeometric distribution. In this paper, we also treat the
hypergeometric distribution HG(L,K,N) with N draws and L samples containing K
success. In fact, the outcome obeys the binary distribution in the case of sampling
with replacement, and the outcome obeys the hypergeometric distribution in the case
of sampling without replacement.
Then, we study the stochastic behavior of the measured values M =
(Ms,M0,M1,M2,M3) under the assumption that the parameters q¯
(0), a¯, and b¯ are
unknown, but are fixed to certain values. For this purpose, we introduce the
random variables Mˇs, Mˇ0, Mˇ1, Mˇ2, Mˇ3 subject to the binary distributions with the same
draws and the same successful probabilities as Ms,M0,M1,M2,M3 by sampling with
replacement. The number of vacuum pulses is N0 +N
(0)
1 +N
(0)
2 +N
(0)
s . The detection
rate in Bob’s side among N0 + N
(0)
1 + N
(0)
2 + N
(0)
s vacuum pulses is fixed. N0 vacuum
pulses are randomly chosen from N0 + N
(0)
1 + N
(0)
2 + N
(0)
s vacuum pulses. Then, the
number M0 of detected pulses among these N0 vacuum pulses obeys the hypergeometric
distribution HG(N0 + N
(0)
1 + N
(0)
2 + N
(0)
s , q¯(0)(N0 + N
(0)
1 + N
(0)
2 + N
(0)
s ), N0). For a
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real number R > q¯(0), the probability Pr{M0
N0
> R} is smaller than the probability
Pr{ Mˇ0
N0
> R}. The reason is as follows. Let L be an arbitrary integer less than N0 − 1.
If the observed detection rate of the initial L transmitted pulses is greater than R, the
detection probability of the L+1-th pulse is less than q¯(0) in the case of sampling without
replacement. Thus, we obtain
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M0 < X−per(N0, q¯(0), ǫ)} ≤ ǫ (72)
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M0 > X+per(N0, q¯(0), ǫ)} ≤ ǫ, (73)
where Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N is the distribution of the random variables M ,J when q¯
(0), a¯, b¯
and ~N are fixed. That is, we obtain
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M¯0 < X−est(N0,M0, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ (74)
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M¯0 > X+est(N0,M0, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ, (75)
where M¯0 is the expectation of M0, which equals q¯
(0)N0.
Remark 5 Here, we should remark that the above analysis does not imply that the
non-replacement case can be reduced to the replacement case perfectly. Let M
(0)
1 be
the number of detected pulses among N
(0)
1 transmitted vacuum pulses and Mˇ
(0)
1 be the
random variable subject to the binary distribution with the same draws and the same
successful probability as M
(0)
1 by sampling with replacement. Since Mˇ0 and Mˇ
(0)
1 are
independent of each other due to sampling with replacement, we have
Pr{Mˇ (0)1 > N (0)1
Mˇ0
N0
+ a} ≤
N
(0)
1∑
k=0
Pr({Mˇ (0)1 ≥ k} ∩ {N (0)1
Mˇ0
N0
≤ a− k})
=
N
(0)
1∑
k=0
Pr{Mˇ (0)1 ≥ k} · Pr{N (0)1
Mˇ0
N0
≤ a− k}. (76)
However, since M0 and M
(0)
1 have no replacement, M0 and M
(0)
1 are not independent
of each other. Hence, the relation (76) does not hold for M0 and M
(0)
1 . That is, the
probability Pr{M (0)1 > N (0)1 M0N0 + a} cannot be bounded by RHS of (76). Instead of RHS
of (76), we have a weaker evaluation,
Pr{M (0)1 > N (0)1
M0
N0
+ a} ≤ Pr{M (0)1 ≥ N (0)1 q¯(0) +
a
2
}+ Pr{N (0)1 q¯(0) −
a
2
≥ N (0)1
M0
N0
}
≤ Pr{Mˇ (0)1 ≥ N (0)1 q¯(0) +
a
2
}+ Pr{N (0)1 q¯(0) −
a
2
≥ N (0)1
Mˇ0
N0
}. (77)
because {M (0)1 > N (0)1 M0N0 + a} ⊂ {M
(0)
1 ≥ N (0)1 q¯(0) + a2} ∪ {N
(0)
1 q¯
(0) − a
2
≥ N (0)1 M0N0 }. That
is, the above discussion cannot yield a better bound (RHS of (76)) but can yield a weaker
bound (RHS of (77)).
Next, we consider a more complicated case, i.e., focus on N1 µ1-intensity pulses,
which contain N
(0)
1 vacuum pulses, N
(1)
1 pulses with the single-photon state, and N
(2)
1
pulses with the state ρ2. Then, the expectation M¯1 ofM1 is
q¯(0)
2
N
(0)
1 + a¯
(1)
× N
(1)
1 + a¯
(2)
× N
(2)
1 .
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Assume that N
(2)
1 = 0 and
q¯(0)
2
< a¯
(1)
× . For a real number R > M¯1/N1, the probability
Pr{M1
N1
> R} is smaller than the probability Pr{ Mˇ1
N1
> R}. This fact can be shown as
follows. Assume that the detection rate among the initial L pulses is greater than R.
Under the above condition, the rate of the single-photon pulses among initial L pulses is
higher than
N
(1)
1
N1
with probability more than 1/2. Conversely, under the above condition,
the rate of the single-photon pulses among remaining N1−L pulses is smaller than N
(1)
1
N1
with probability more than 1/2. Hence, the detecting probability of the L+ 1-th pulse
is less than M¯1/N1. Therefore,
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M1 < X−per(N1,
M¯1
N1
, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ (78)
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M1 > X+per(N1,
M¯1
N1
, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ, (79)
which implies that
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M¯1 < X−est(N1,M1, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ (80)
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M¯0 > X+est(N1,M1, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ. (81)
Repeating a similar discussion, we can show the above relations without the condition
N
(2)
1 = 0.
Similarly, the expectations M 2 and M3 of M2 and M3 are calculated to
q¯(0)
2
N
(0)
2 +
a¯
(1)
× N
(1)
2 + a¯
(2)
× N
(2)
2 + a¯
(3)
× N
(3)
2 and
q¯(0)
2
N
(0)
1 + b¯
(1)
× N
(1)
1 + b¯
(2)
× N
(2)
1 , and are denoted by M¯2
and M¯3, respectively. Then, we obtain
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M¯2 < X−est(N2,M2, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ (82)
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M¯2 > X+est(N2,M2, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ (83)
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M¯3 < X−est(N1,M3, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ (84)
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{M¯3 > X+est(N1,M3, ǫ)} ≤ ǫ. (85)
For a detail discussion, see [42].
8. Outlines of security proof
8.1. Requirement for a function estimating the leaked information φ from M and ~N
In this section, we give the outline of the security proof of the formula of the sacrifice
bit-length given in Subsection 5.1 while their partitions will be given in latter sections.
First, we fix the partition ~N of transmitted pulses. The aim of this subsection is to give
our requirement for a function estimating the leaked information φ from the measured
values M = (Ms,M0,M1,M2,M3) and the partition ~N . For this purpose, we introduce
three conditions for the partition ~N .
Condition 4
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1 > 0. (86)
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Condition 5
N
(2)
1 N
(0)
2 −N (0)1 N (2)2 < 0. (87)
Condition 6
− N
(2)
1 N
(0)
2 −N (2)2 N (0)1
2(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (2)1 N (1)2 )
− N
(0)
1
N
(1)
1
< 0. (88)
If the all values take their expectation, the left hand side of Condition 4 is
1
2
e−µ1−µ2µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1)ω2N1N2, and is positive. In the same assumption, the left hand
side of Condition 5 is 1
2
N1N2e
−(µ1+µ2)ω2(µ
2
1 − µ22), and is negative.
Condition 6 is equivalent to
N
(2)
2 −
N
(2)
1 N
(0)
2
N
(0)
1
=
N
(2)
2 N
(0)
1 −N (2)1 N (0)2
N
(0)
1
<
2(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (2)1 N (1)2 )
N
(1)
1
= 2N
(2)
2 − 2
N
(2)
1 N
(1)
2
N
(1)
1
.
The above condition is equivalent to
2
N
(2)
1 N
(1)
2
N
(1)
1
− N
(2)
1 N
(0)
2
N
(0)
1
< N
(2)
2 . (89)
Then, this condition is converted to
2
N
(1)
2
N
(1)
1
<
N
(0)
2
N
(0)
1
+
N
(2)
2
N
(2)
1
. (90)
When the all values take their expectation, the left hand side is 2µ2
µ1
e−µ2+µ1 , and the
right hand side is (
µ22
µ21
+ 1)e−µ2+µ1 . Then, the above condition holds. Hence, these three
assumptions are natural.
In the following, in order to give an upper bound of φ(J), for a given real
number β > 0, we assume that there exists a function φˆa of ~N and measured values
M = (Ms,M0,M1,M2,M3) satisfying that
Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{φˆa(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ≤ 8 · 2−2β−8. (91)
Indeed, in Section 9, we will give its concrete example φˆ3. The relation (91) implies the
relations
Pr
M ,J | ~N{φˆa(M , ~N) < φ(J)}
=
∑
q¯(0),a¯,b¯
Qe(q¯
(0), a¯, b¯| ~N)Pr
M ,J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{φˆa(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ≤ 8 · 2−2β−8,
where Qe is the conditional distribution of q¯
(0), a¯, b¯ conditioned with the partition ~N .
8.2. Requirement for a function estimating the leaked information φ from M
This subsection has three aims. The first aim is to give a requirement for a
function estimating the leaked information φ from the measured values M =
(Ms,M0,M1,M2,M3). The second aim is to give the sacrifice bit-length by using a
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function satisfying this requirement. The final aim is to figure out the structure of our
formula of the sacrifice bit-length, which gives the detail of Figs. 1 and 2.
Now, we remember the definition of the set Ω1 and Condition 1. Condition 1 is
equivalent to the condition that any element ~N ∈ Ω1 satisfies Conditions 4, 5, and 6.
In the following, we assume that there exists a real-valued function φˆb of the measured
value M that satisfies that
{φˆb(M) < φˆa(M , ~N)} ⊂ Ωc1 (92)
under Condition 1. In Section 10, we will give a concrete function φˆ4 satisfying the above
condition. Note that the value φˆb(M) does not depend on the partition ~N . Then, we
can show the following theorem.
Theorem 1 When Condition 1 holds and the function φˆb satisfies (92), we obtain
PrJ ,M{φˆb(M) < φ(J)} ≤ 3 · 2−2β−5. (93)
Proof. The definition of Ω1 yields that
Pr ~NΩ
c
1 ≤ 2 · 5 · 2−2β−8.
Since
{φˆb(M) < φ(J)} ⊂ {φˆa(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ∪ {φˆb(M) < φˆa(M , ~N)}
⊂ {φˆa(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ∪ Ωc1 ⊂ ({φˆa(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ∩ Ω1) ∪ Ωc1,
we have
PrJ ,M{φˆb(M) < φ(J)} ≤ PrM ,J , ~N({φˆa(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ∩ Ω1) + PrM ,J , ~NΩc1
≤ 8 · 2−2β−8 + 10 · 2−2β−8 ≤ 24 · 2−2β−8 = 3 · 2−2β−5,
which implies the desired argument. 
Therefore, when ρA,E is the final state with the sacrifice bit-length
S(M) := φˆb(M) + 2β + 5, (94)
(8) implies that
Pph ≤ 2−2β−5Pr{φˆb(M) + 2β + 5 < φ(J) + 2β + 5}c
+ Pr{φˆb(M) + 2β + 5 < φ(J) + 2β + 5}
= 2−2β−5 + 3 · 2−2β−5 = 2−2β−3.
Thus, the relation (2) implies
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ 2
√
22(−2β−3)/2 = 2−β. (95)
In summary, since Theorem 1 requires Condition 1, we need to choose the
parameters µ1, µ2, N0, N1, and N2 so that Condition 1 holds. That is, we need to
choose sufficiently large integers N0, N1, and N2. Otherwise, we cannot apply Theorem
1, i.e., we cannot guarantee the security.
The latter sections give a formula of the sacrifice bit-length S as a function of
β, µs, µ1, µ2, Ns, N0, N1, N2, andM by giving a concrete example of φˆb. In order to apply
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interval estimation and percent point, we have to decide which upper or lower bound
to be used in the respective steps. These decisions will be done based on derivatives for
respective variables. Hence, the calculations of these derivatives are the main issues in
the latter sections.
9. Derivation of upper bound of leaked information
9.1. Case when the channel parameters are given
The purpose of this section is to derive an upper bound φˆ3(M , ~N) of the leaked
information φ as an example of φˆa. For this purpose, we describe the leaked information
φ as a function of J (0), J (1), and r(1) := J
(1)
e /J (1):
φ = Ms − J (0) − J (1)(1− h(min{r(1), 1/2})). (96)
That is, φ is monotonically decreasing with respect to J (0) and J (1), and monotonically
increasing with respect to r(1). Due to the same reason as (72), the channel parameters
q¯(0), a¯
(1)
× , and b¯
(1)
× satisfy
Pr
J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{J (0) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µs q¯(0), 2−2β−8)} ≤ 2−2β−8 (97)
Pr
J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{J (1) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µsµs(a¯(1)× + b¯(1)× ), 2−2β−8)} ≤ 2−2β−8. (98)
Using this fact, we give estimates of J (0) and J (1) as
Jˆ (0)(q¯(0), Ns, µs) := X
−
per(Ns, e
−µs q¯(0), 2−2β−8) (99)
Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs) := X
−
per(Ns, e
−µsµs(a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
× ), 2
−2β−8), (100)
which provide Step (4) in Figs. 1 and 2. Since p+per(j
(1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
×
+b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8) ≤
p+per(j˜
(1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
×
+b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8) holds for j(1) ≥ j˜(1), (98) implies that
Pr
J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N
{
p+per
(
J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)
≥ p+per
(
Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)}
= Pr
J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{J (1) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µsµs(a¯(1)× + b¯(1)× ), 2−2β−8)} ≤ 2−2β−8.
Using the relation
Pr
J |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N
{J (1)e
J (1)
≥ p+per
(
J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)}
≤ 2−2β−8, (101)
we obtain{J (1)e
J (1)
≥ p+per
(
Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)}
⊂
({
p+per
(
J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)
≥ p+per
(
Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)}
∪
{J (1)e
J (1)
≥ p+per
(
J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)})
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⊂ {J (1) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µsµs(a¯(1)× + b¯(1)× ), 2−2β−8)} ∪
{J (1)e
J (1)
≥ p+per
(
J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)}
.
(102)
Therefore, we give an estimate of r(1) := J
(1)
e
J(1)
by
rˆ
(1)
× (a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs) := p
+
per
(
Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)
. (103)
Using the above relations, we give an estimate of φ by
φˆ1(q¯
(0), a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs)
:= Ms − Jˆ (0)(q¯(0), Ns, µs)− Jˆ (1)(a¯(1)× , b¯(1)× , Ns, µs)(1− h(min{rˆ(1)× (a¯(1)× , b¯(1)× , Ns, µs), 1/2})).
(104)
Due to (97), (98), (102), and (101), the estimate φˆ1(q¯
(0), a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs) satisfies
{φ(J) > φˆ1(q¯(0), a¯(1)× , b¯(1)× , Ns, µs)}
⊂
(
{J (0) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µs q¯(0), 2−2β−8)} ∪ {J (1) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µsµs(a¯(1)× + b¯(1)× ), 2−2β−8)}
∪
{J (1)e
J (1)
≥ p+per
(
Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)})
⊂
(
{J (0) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µs q¯(0), 2−2β−8)} ∪ {J (1) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µsµs(a¯(1)× + b¯(1)× ), 2−2β−8)}
∪
{J (1)e
J (1)
≥ p+per
(
J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−8
)})
. (105)
Hence, we obtain
Pr{φ(J) > φˆ1(q¯(0), a¯(1)× , b¯(1)× , Ns, µs)} ≤ 3 · 2−2β−8. (106)
9.2. Estimation of channel parameters q¯(0), a¯
(1)
× , and r¯
(1)
×
Next, in order to treat an upper bound of leaked information φ, we will give estimates of
channel parameters q¯(0), a¯
(1)
× , and r¯
(1)
× based on the measured valuesM and the partition
~N of pulses. For this estimation, we employ the one-sided interval estimation. We have
to decide which the lower one-sided interval estimator or the upper one-sided interval
estimator is used for the respective channel parameters. These decisions will be done by
the signs of the partial derivatives of φˆ1(q¯
(0), a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs) with respect to q¯
(0), a¯
(1)
× ,
and b¯
(1)
× , respectively.
While the partial derivatives of Jˆ (0)(q¯(0), Ns, µs), Jˆ
(1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs), and
rˆ
(1)
× (a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs) are needed, their calculations are not easy. When Ns is sufficiently
large, these values take the almost same values as q¯(0)e−µsNs, (a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
× )e
−µsµsNs, and
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
×
+b¯
(1)
×
, and the variations due to the fluctuations of q¯(0), a¯
(1)
× , and b¯
(1)
× are negligible.
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Hence, we can regard the derivatives of Jˆ (0)(q¯(0), Ns, µs), Jˆ
(1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs), and
rˆ
(1)
× (a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs) as the same as those of q¯
(0)e−µsNs, (a¯
(1)
× +b¯
(1)
× )e
−µsµsNs, and
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
×
+b¯
(1)
×
.
Thus, we obtain
∂Jˆ (0)(q¯(0), Ns, µs)
∂q¯(0)
= e−µsNs,
∂Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs)
∂a¯
(1)
×
= e−µsµsNs,
∂Jˆ (1)(a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs)
∂b¯
(1)
×
= e−µsµsNs,
∂rˆ
(1)
× (a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs)
∂a¯
(1)
×
= − b¯
(1)
×
(a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
× )
2
,
∂rˆ
(1)
× (a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs)
∂b¯
(1)
×
=
a¯
(1)
×
(a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
× )
2
.
Under this assumption, we have
∂φˆ1(q¯
(0), a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs)
∂q¯(0)
=
∂φ
∂J (0)
∂Jˆ (0)
∂q¯(0)
= −e−µsNs < 0 (107)
∂φˆ1(q¯
(0), a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs)
∂a¯
(1)
×
=
∂φ
∂J (1)
∂Jˆ (1)
∂a¯
(1)
×
+
∂φ
∂r¯
(1)
×
∂rˆ
(1)
×
∂a¯
(1)
×
= −e−µsµsNs(1 + log a¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
) < 0 (108)
∂φˆ1(q¯
(0), a¯
(1)
× , b¯
(1)
× , Ns, µs)
∂b¯
(1)
×
=
∂φ
∂J (1)
∂Jˆ (1)
∂b¯
(1)
×
+
∂φ
∂r¯
(1)
×
∂rˆ
(1)
×
∂b¯
(1)
×
= −e−µsµsNs(1 + log b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
) > 0 (109)
because
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
×
+b¯
(1)
×
< 1
2
. Therefore, smaller q¯(0) and a¯
(1)
× yield larger φˆ1, and larger b¯
(1)
×
yields larger φˆ1. That is, it is needed to estimate q¯
(0) and a¯
(1)
× to be smaller and b¯
(1)
× to
be larger.
In the following, we treat the estimation of q¯(0), a¯
(1)
× , and b¯
(1)
× . Here, we should
remark that we have two kinds of channel parameters. The first kind of parameters
are q¯(0), a¯
(1)
× , and b¯
(1)
× , which are directly linked to the eavesdropping and cannot be
measured directly. The second kind of parameters are the detection rates p1,× and p2,×
of pulses of the phase basis with intensities µ1 and µ2, which can be measured directly.
Similarly, as the second latter kind of parameters, we have the rates s1,× and s2,× of
the detected pulses having phase error with intensities µ1 and µ2 to the transmitted
pulses with intensities µ1 and µ2, respectively. The rates s1,× and s2,× also can be
measured directly. Hence, the expectations M¯0, M¯1, M¯2, and M¯3 of M0, M1, M2, and
M3 are characterized by M¯0 = p0N0, M¯1 = (p1,× − s1,×)N1, M¯2 = (p2,× − s2,×)N2, and
M¯3 = s1,×N1. Thus, we can regard M¯0, M¯1, M¯2, and M¯3 as the second kind of channel
parameters. Since M¯0, M¯1, M¯2, and M¯3 are easier to treat than p0, p1,×, p2,×, s1,×, and
s2,×, we can estimate an upper bound of the leaked information φ via the estimation of
the channel parameters q¯(0), a¯
(1)
× , and b¯
(1)
× when the channel parameters M¯ := (M¯0, M¯1,
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M¯2, M¯3) and the partition ~N of pulses are given. Then, using the expansion formula
(13), we obtain
M¯0 = q¯
(0)N0 (110)
M¯1 =
q¯(0)
2
N
(0)
1 + a¯
(1)
× N
(1)
1 + a¯
(2)
× N
(2)
1 (111)
M¯2 =
q¯(0)
2
N
(0)
2 + a¯
(1)
× N
(1)
2 + a¯
(2)
× N
(2)
2 + a¯
(3)
× N
(3)
2 , (112)
which imply the matrix equation
 M¯0M¯1
M¯2 − a¯(3)× N (3)2

 =

 N0 0 0N (0)1 /2 N (1)1 N (2)1
N
(0)
2 /2 N
(1)
2 N
(2)
2



 q¯
(0)
a¯
(1)
×
a¯
(2)
×

 . (113)
Solving the above, we obtain
q¯(0) = qˆ(0)(M¯0) :=
M¯0
N0
(114)
a¯
(1)
× = a˜
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N) + A1a¯
(3)
× (115)
a˜
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N) :=
N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ(0)(M¯0)Nˆ (0)1 /2)− Nˆ (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)(M¯0)Nˆ (0)2 /2)
Nˆ
(1)
1 Nˆ
(2)
2 − Nˆ (1)2 Nˆ (2)1
(116)
A1 :=
N
(2)
1 N
(3)
2
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
. (117)
Since A1 and a¯
(3)
× are non-negative, we obtain a lower bound of a¯
(1)
× .
a¯
(1)
× ≥ aˆ(1)(M¯ , ~N) := [a˜(1)(M¯ , ~N)]+. (118)
Similarly, we have
M¯3 = q¯
(0)N
(0)
1 /2 + b¯
(1)
× N
(1)
1 + b¯
(2)
× N
(2)
1 . (119)
Since b¯
(2)
× is non-negative, we obtain an upper bound of b¯
(1)
× as
b¯
(1)
× ≤ bˆ(1)× (M¯ , ~N) :=
[
M¯3 − 12 qˆ(0)(M¯0)N (0)1
N
(1)
1
]
+
. (120)
That is, (114), (116), and (120) give Step (3) in Figs. 1 and 2. Then, we can define an
upper bound of φˆ1 as
φˆ2(Mˆ(M), ~N) := φˆ1(qˆ
(0)(M¯0), aˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ(M), ~N), bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ(M), ~N), Ns, µs)
= Ms − Jˆ (0)(qˆ(0)(M¯0), Ns, µs)
− Jˆ (1)(aˆ(1)× (Mˆ(M), ~N), bˆ(1)× (Mˆ(M), ~N), Ns, µs)
× (1− h(min{rˆ(1)× (aˆ(1)× (Mˆ(M), ~N), bˆ(1)× (Mˆ(M), ~N), Ns, µs), 1/2})), (121)
where Mˆ(M) is the estimate of M¯ when M is observed.
Indeed, when a¯
(1)
× = aˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N) and b¯
(1)
× = bˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N), the relations
M¯1 =
M¯0
2N0
N
(0)
1 + aˆ
(1)
× N
(1)
1 + aˆ
(2)
× N
(2)
1 (122)
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M¯2 =
M¯0
2N0
N
(0)
2 + aˆ
(1)
× N
(1)
2 + aˆ
(2)
× N
(2)
2 (123)
M¯3 =
M¯0
2N0
N
(0)
1 + bˆ
(1)
× N
(1)
1 (124)
hold.
Remark 6 When we extend the existing method[10, 11, 12, 8, 13] to our finite length
setting, we obtain the following evaluation. In this case, we employ the parameter q¯(1)
instead of a¯
(1)
× . Because smaller q¯
(1) yields larger φˆ1, similar to a¯
(1)
× , q¯
(1) can be estimated
as
qˆ(1)(M¯ , ~N) :=
N
(2)
2 (M¯1 + M¯3 − M¯0N (0)1 /N0)−N (2)1 (M¯2 + M¯4 − M¯0N (0)2 /N0)
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
. (125)
Then, in the upper bound φˆ1 of the sacrifice bit size, aˆ
(1)
× + bˆ
(1)
× is replaced by qˆ
(1)(M¯ , ~N).
That is, we obtain an upper bound
φˆ1(qˆ
(0)(M¯0), qˆ
(1)(M¯ , ~N)− bˆ(1)× (M¯ , ~N), bˆ(1)× (M¯ , ~N), Ns, µs), (126)
which is larger than φˆ2(Mˆ(M), ~N) because qˆ
(1)(M¯ , ~N)− bˆ(1)× (M¯ , ~N) ≤ aˆ(1)× (M¯ , ~N).
9.3. Estimation of another kind of channel parameters M¯
In this subsection, we treat the estimation of the channel parameters M¯ that is required
to estimate the channel parameters q¯(0), a¯
(1)
× , and b¯
(1)
× when the partition ~N = (N1, N2)
of pulses is known. That is, we consider the method to estimate M¯0, M¯1, M¯2, and M¯3
from the measured value M0,M1,M2, and M3.
For this purpose, we introduce the following assumption for M¯ .
Condition 7 Any element ~N ∈ Ω1 satisfies
bˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N)
aˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N) + bˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N)
≤ 1
8
. (127)
The partial derivatives of qˆ(0)(M¯0), aˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N), and bˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N) are calculated as
∂qˆ(0)
∂M¯0
=
1
N0
> 0 (128)
∂qˆ(0)
∂M¯1
=
∂qˆ(0)
∂M¯2
=
∂qˆ(0)
∂M¯3
=
∂qˆ(0)
∂M¯4
= 0, (129)
∂aˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯0
=
(N
(2)
1 N
(0)
2 −N (2)2 N (0)1 )
2N0(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1 )
(130)
∂aˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯1
=
N
(2)
2
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
(131)
∂aˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯2
= − N
(2)
1
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
(132)
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∂aˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯3
= 0, (133)
∂bˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯0
= − N
(0)
1
2N0N
(1)
1
< 0 (134)
∂bˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯3
=
1
N
(1)
1
> 0 (135)
∂bˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯1
=
∂bˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯2
= 0. (136)
Hence, applying Conditions 4 and 5 to (130),(131),(132), we obtain
∂aˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯0
< 0,
∂aˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯1
> 0,
∂aˆ
(1)
×
∂M¯2
< 0.
Thus, due to (107), (108), (109), and Conditions 6 and 7, we obtain
∂φˆ1
∂M¯1
< 0,
∂φˆ1
∂M¯2
> 0,
∂φˆ1
∂M¯3
> 0,
∂φˆ1
∂M¯0
= − Nse
−µs
N0
−
Nse
−µsµs(N
(2)
1 N
(0)
2 −N (2)2 N (0)1 )(1 + log aˆ
(1)
×
aˆ
(1)
×
+bˆ
(1)
×
)
2N0(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (2)1 N (1)2 )
+
Nse
−µsµsN
(0)
1 (1 + log
bˆ
(1)
×
aˆ
(1)
×
+bˆ
(1)
×
)
2N0N
(1)
1
≤ − Nse
−µs
N0
− Nse
−µsµs(N
(2)
1 N
(0)
2 −N (2)2 N (0)1 )
2N0(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (2)1 N (1)2 )
− Nse
−µsµsN
(0)
1
N0N
(1)
1
< 0.
Hence, we need to estimate M¯0 and M¯1 to be smaller, and M¯2 and M¯3 to be larger.
In the following, we employ
Mˆ0(M0) := X
−
est(N0,M0, 2
−2β−8), (137)
Mˆ1(M1) := X
−
est(N1,M1, 2
−2β−8), (138)
Mˆ2(M2) := X
+
est(N2,M2, 2
−2β−8), (139)
Mˆ3(M3) := X
+
est(N1,M3, 2
−2β−8), (140)
as estimates of M¯0, M¯1, M¯2, and M¯3, which give Step (1) in Figs. 1 and 2. Then, we
define the function φˆ3
φˆ3(M , ~N) := φˆ2(Mˆ(M), ~N),
which satisfies the condition (91) for φˆa, as is guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 When the partition ~N belongs to Ω1 and satisfies Conditions 4 and 5, and
when Mˆ(M) satisfies Condition 7, the relation
Pr
J ,M |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{φˆ3(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ≤ 8 · 2−2β−8
holds.
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Proof. The definition of φˆ2 given in (121) yields
{φˆ3(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ⊂ {φˆ2(M¯ , ~N) < φ(J)} ∪ {φˆ3(M , ~N) < φˆ2(M¯ , ~N)}
⊂ {φˆ1(q¯(0), a¯(1)× , b¯(1)× , Ns, µs) < φ(J)} ∪ {φˆ3(M , ~N) < φˆ2(M¯ , ~N)}. (141)
Hence, the above calculations of the partial derivatives and Conditions 4 and 5 imply
{φˆ3(M , ~N) < φˆ2(M¯ , ~N)}
⊂ {q¯0 < qˆ(0)(M0)} ∪ {M¯1 < Mˆ1(M1)} ∪ {Mˆ2(M2) < M¯2} ∪ {Mˆ3(M3) < M¯3}.
Thus, it follows from the relations (74), (80), (83), and (85) that
Pr
J ,M |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{φˆ3(M , ~N) < φˆ2(M¯ , ~N)} ≤ 4 · 2−2β−8. (142)
Using (141) and (106), we obtain
Pr
J ,M |q¯(0),a¯,b¯, ~N{φˆ3(M , ~N) < φ(J)} ≤ 3 · 2−2β−8 + 4 · 2−2β−8 ≤ 8 · 2−2β−8.

Remark 7 When the vacuum pulse has a possibility to contain a non-vacuum state, we
adjust the estimate qˆ(0)(M0) as follows
qˆ(0)(M0) := p
+
est(N0 −X+per(N0, q, 2−2β−8),M0 −X+per(N0, q, 2−2β−8), 2−2β−8) (143)
where the vacuum pulse becomes a non-vacuum state with a probability q. Let N
(1)
0 be
the number of non-vacuum pulses among N0 pulses. Then,
{q¯0 < qˆ(0)(M0)} ⊂ {N (1)0 > X+per(N0, q, 2−2β−8)} ∪ {q¯0 < p+est(N0 −N
(1)
0 ,M0 −N (1)0 , 2−2β−8)}.
Hence, the probability of {q¯0 < qˆ(0)(M0)} is less than 2 · 2−2β−8. Thus, in the proof
of Theorem 2, we replace the right hand side of (142) by 5 · 2−2β−8. Then, since
3 · 2−2β−8 + 5 · 2−2β−8 = 8 · 2−2β−8, we obtain Theorem 2 in this adjustment.
10. Derivation of upper bound φˆb of leaked information
10.1. Characterizations of Conditions 2 and 3
In this section, we define the upper bound φˆb(M) satisfying (92) as a function of
the measured value M . Note that the upper bound φˆb(M) does not depend on the
partition ~N . In this subsection, for this purpose, we recall Conditions 2 and 3, which
are conditions for µ1, µ2, N0, N1, N2 and the observed data M . Condition 3 plays an
alternative role of Condition 7.
Substituting M¯ into Mˆ , and applying the relations (122), (123), and (124), we can
calculate the above values as
A
(0)
1 = (aˆ
(1)
× − qˆ(0)/2)N (2)2 , A(1)1 = (aˆ(2)× − aˆ(1)× )N (2)2
A
(1)
2 = aˆ
(1)
× N
(2)
1 , A
(2)
2 = aˆ
(2)
× N
(2)
2 , B
(1)
1 = bˆ
(1)
× N
(1)
1 .
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Now, we show that these values take positive values, naturally. Assume that there is no
eavesdrop, i.e., That is, we adopt the following model [51, 52]
pi,+ = pi,× = 1− e−αµi + p0,
si,+ = si,× = s(1− e−αµi) + p0
2
, (144)
where α is the total transmission including quantum efficiency of the detector, and
s is the error due to the imperfection of the optical system. This model implies
pi,× − si,× = (1 − s)(1 − e−αµi) + p02 . As was shown in the beginning of Section 8,
when all of ~N are close to their expectations, aˆ
(2)
× − qˆ(0)/2 and aˆ(2)× − aˆ(1)× are positive.
Thus, Condition 2 holds under the condition (144). Similarly, Condition 3 holds under
the condition (144) with small s. Since the condition (144) is a natural assumption,
Conditions 2 and 3 can be regarded as natural assumptions. Hence, we need to choose
the initial parameters µ1, µ2, N0, N1, N2 so that Conditions 2 and 3 hold with high
probability without the presence of an eavesdropper.
Here, we need to pay attention to the difference between Condition 1 and Conditions
2 and 1. Conditions 2 and 3 are assumptions for the initial parameters µ1, µ2, N0, N1,
and N2. On the other hand, Condition 1 is an assumption for the measured values M
and the initial parameters µ1, µ2, N0, N1, and N2. This is because the estimates Mˆ
are determined from the measured values M via the relations (137), (138), (139), and
(140).
10.2. Derivation of ~N = (N1, N2)
Next, in order to derive the estimates ofN1 andN2 giving an upper bound of φˆ3(M), we
calculate the partial derivatives of φˆ1 with respect to N1 and N2. For this purpose, we
calculate the partial derivatives of aˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N) with respect to N
(0)
1 , N
(1)
1 , N
(0)
2 , N
(1)
2 , N
(2)
2
as follows.
∂aˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0), ~N)
∂N
(0)
1
=
Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)(N (0)2 +N (2)2 )/2
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
−N (1)2
N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ(0)N (0)1 /2)−N (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)N (0)2 /2)
(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1 )2
,
∂aˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0), ~N)
∂N
(1)
1
=
Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)N (0)2 /2
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
− (N (2)2 +N (1)2 )
N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ(0)N (0)1 /2)−N (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ(0)N (0)2 /2)
(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1 )2
,
∂aˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0), ~N)
∂N
(0)
2
=
N
(2)
1 qˆ
(0)/2
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
,
∂aˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0), ~N)
∂N
(1)
2
=
N
(2)
1 (N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ
(0)
2
N
(0)
1 )−N (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ
(0)
2
N
(0)
2 ))
(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1 )2
,
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∂aˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0), ~N)
∂N
(2)
2
=
Mˆ1 − qˆ
(0)(M0)
2
N
(0)
1
N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1
− N
(1)
1 (N
(2)
2 (Mˆ1 − qˆ
(0)
2
N
(0)
1 )−N (2)1 (Mˆ2 − qˆ
(0)
2
N
(0)
2 ))
(N
(1)
1 N
(2)
2 −N (1)2 N (2)1 )2
.
Here, we should remark that N
(2)
1 = N1 − N (0)1 − N (1)1 . That is, the variable N (2)1 is a
dependent variable. Due to Condition 2, all of the above values are positive.
Next, under Condition 2, we calculate the partial derivatives of bˆ
(1)
× (M¯ , ~N) with
respect to N
(0)
1 , N
(1)
1 , N
(0)
2 , N
(1)
2 , N
(2)
2 as follows.
∂bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0), ~N)
∂N
(0)
1
= − qˆ
(0)
2N
(1)
1
< 0
∂bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0), ~N)
∂N
(1)
1
= −Mˆ3 − qˆ
(0)N
(0)
1 /2
(N
(1)
1 )
2
< 0
∂bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0), ~N)
∂N
(0)
2
=
∂bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0),N1,N2)
∂N
(1)
2
=
∂bˆ
(1)
× (Mˆ , qˆ
(0),N1,N2)
∂N
(2)
2
= 0.
Since ∂φˆ1
∂a¯
(1)
×
< 0 and ∂φˆ1
∂b¯
(1)
×
> 0, due to (108) and (109), any element ~N ∈ Ω1 satisfies
∂φˆ1
∂N
(0)
1
< 0,
∂φˆ1
∂N
(1)
1
< 0,
∂φˆ1
∂N
(0)
2
< 0,
∂φˆ1
∂N
(1)
2
< 0,
∂φˆ1
∂N
(2)
2
< 0.
Thus, since N
(0)
1 , N
(1)
1 , N
(0)
2 , N
(1)
2 , and N
(2)
2 obey the binomial distribution, we decide
Nˆ1 = (Nˆ
(0)
1 , Nˆ
(1)
1 ) and Nˆ2 = (Nˆ
(0)
2 , Nˆ
(1)
2 , Nˆ
(2)
2 ) in the following way:
Nˆ
(0)
1 := X
−
per(N1, e
−µ1 , 2−2β−8) (145)
Nˆ
(1)
1 := X
−
per(N1, µ1e
−µ1 , 2−2β−8) (146)
Nˆ
(0)
2 := X
−
per(N2, e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8) (147)
Nˆ
(1)
2 := X
−
per(N2, µ2e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8) (148)
Nˆ
(2)
2 := X
−
per(N2, ω2µ
2
2e
−µ2 , 2−2β−8), (149)
which give Step (2) in Figs. 1 and 2. Then, we define
φˆ4(M) :=
{
φˆ2(Mˆ (M),
~ˆ
N) if Conditions 1, 2 and 3 hold
M otherwise.
(150)
Due to the definition, any element ~N ∈ Ω1 satisfies
φˆ4(M) ≥ φˆ3(M , ~N), (151)
i.e., the function φˆ4 satisfies the condition (92) for φˆb when φˆa is φˆ3. In summary, when
the parameters µ1, µ2, Ns, N0, N1, and N2 satisfy Condition 1, and when we choose the
sacrifice bit-length
S(M) = φˆ4(M) + 2β + 5
=
{
φˆ2(Mˆ(M),
~ˆ
N) + 2β + 5 if Conditions 1, 2 and 3 hold
M + 2β + 5 otherwise,
(152)
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due to (95), we obtain ‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ 2−β. Note that φˆ2(Mˆ(M),
~ˆ
N) is given in
(121), which is the same as φˆ2 given in (31). Since M + 2β + 5 is greater than dimC1,
the formula (152) implies the abort of the protocol when one of Conditions 1, 2 and 3
does not hold. Hence, we obtain (15) under the formula given in Subsection 5.1.
11. Security proof of improved formula
Up to the previous section, based on (95) given in Section 8, we evaluate the universal
composability criterion with the finite-length setting. However, the above given
evaluation can be improved by removing the square root for a part of probabilities.
The improved formula for the sacrifice bit-length given in Subsection 5.2 is derived by
removing the square root for a part of probabilities. The purpose of this section is to
show the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The improved formula for the sacrifice bit-length given in Subsection 5.2
satisfies
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ 2−β. (153)
Now, we will show the above theorem. For this purpose, we discuss the formula
(2) more deeply. Let s = (s1, . . . , sNs+N0+N1+N2) be the indicators of the kinds of initial
states of pulses received by Bob. The indicators are decided as follows. If the i-th
received state is the vacuum state, si is 0. If the i-th received state is the single-photon
state, si is 1. If the i-th received state is the state ρ2, si is 2. Otherwise, si is 3. The
information s contains all of information for N and (J (0), J (1), J (2)). That is, s decides
N and (J (0), J (1), J (2)). However, it cannot decide J
(1)
e .
Once we apply (2) to the case when s is fixed, we obtain
‖ρA,E|s − ρideal |s‖1 ≤ 2
√
2
√
Pph|s, (154)
where ρA,E|s, ρideal |s, and Pph|s are the final true composite state, the ideal final state,
and the averaged virtual decoding phase error probability conditioned with s. Hence,
the final true composite state ρA,E and the ideal final state ρideal are written as
ρA,E =
∑
s
P (s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρA,E|s,
ρideal =
∑
s
P (s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρideal |s.
Hence, for a set Ω of s, we have
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 =
∑
s
P (s)‖ρA,E|s − ρideal |s‖1 ≤
∑
s
P (s)min{2
√
2
√
Pph|s, 2}
≤ 2P (Ωc) + 2
√
2
√∑
s∈Ω
P (s)Pph|s. (155)
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We choose the set Ω as
Ω := Ω1 ∩ {J (0) ≥ X−per(N (0), q¯(0), 2−β−6)} ∩ {J (1) ≥ X−per(N (1), a¯(1)× + b¯(1)× , 2−β−6)}
∩ {q¯0 < qˆ(0)(Mˆ0(M0))}.
Hence, using (155), we obtain
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ maxρ,σ ‖ρ− σ‖1 · (5 · 2 + 3) · 2
−β−6 + 2
√
2
√∑
s∈Ω
P (s)Pph|s
= 2 · 13 · 2−β−2 + 2
√
2
√∑
s∈Ω
P (s)Pph|s. (156)
Since φˆ4(M) ≥ φˆ3(Mˆ(M), ~N) for ~N ∈ Ω1, as was shown in (151), the relations
(141), (142), and (105) guarantee that
Ω ∩ {φˆ4(M) < φ(J)} ⊂ Ω ∩ {φˆ3(M , ~N) < φ(J)}
⊂ Ω ∩
(
{φˆ1(q¯(0), a¯(1)× , b¯(1)× , Ns, µs) < φ(J)} ∪ {φˆ3(M , ~N) < φˆ2(M¯ , ~N)}
)
⊂ Ω ∩
(
{J (0) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µs q¯(0), 2−β−6)} ∪ {J (1) ≤ X−per(Ns, e−µsµs(a¯(1)× + b¯(1)× ), 2−β−6)}
∪
{
p+per
(
J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−7
)
≤ J
(1)
e
J (1)
}
∪{q¯0 < qˆ(0)(Mˆ0(M0))} ∪ {M¯1 < Mˆ1(M1)} ∪ {M¯2 > Mˆ2(M2)} ∪ {M¯3 > Mˆ3(M3)}
)
⊂ Ω ∩
(
{J
(1)
e
J (1)
≥ p+per(J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−7)}
∪{M¯1 < Mˆ1(M1)} ∪ {M¯2 > Mˆ2(M2)} ∪ {M¯3 > Mˆ3(M3)}
)
⊂
{J (1)e
J (1)
≥ p+per
(
J (1),
b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
× + b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−7
)}
∪ {M¯1 < Mˆ1(M1)}
∪{M¯2 > Mˆ2(M2)} ∪ {M¯3 > Mˆ3(M3)}.
Hence, due to (152),∑
s∈Ω
P (s)Pph|s ≤ PrΩ ∩ {φˆ4(M) < φ(J)}+ 2−2β−5
≤ 4 · 2−2β−7 + 2−2β−5 = 2−2β−4.
Thus, using (156), we obtain
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ 2 · 13 · 2−β−6 + 2
√
2 · 2−2β−42 ≤ 2−β (157)
because 2
√
2+ 13
16
(∼= 3.64) ≤ 4. Indeed, in order to put out a probability from the square
root, the event corresponding to the probability must be defined by s, i.e., the probability
conditioned with s must take the value 1 or 0. Hence, the probabilities corresponding
to the sets {J(1)e
J(1)
≥ p+per(J (1), b¯
(1)
×
a¯
(1)
×
+b¯
(1)
×
, 2−2β−7)}, {M¯1 < Mˆ1(M1)}, {M¯2 > Mˆ2(M2)}, and
{M¯3 > Mˆ3(M3)} cannot be put out from the square root.
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In summary, when the parameters µ1, µ2, N0, N1, and N2 satisfy Condition 1
modified in Subsection 5.2, and when we choose the sacrifice bit-length S(M) =
φˆ4(M) + 2β + 5 by using the choice of φˆ4(M) given in (150) with the modification
given in Subsection 5.2, we obtain ‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ 2−β.
Remark 8 When the vacuum pulse has a possibility to contain a non-vacuum state, we
adjust the estimate qˆ(0)(Mˆ0(M0)) as (57). Then,
{q¯0 < qˆ(0)(M0)} ⊂ {N (1)0 > X+per(N0, q, 2−β−6)} ∪ {q¯0 < p+est(N0 −N
(1)
0 ,M0 −N (1)0 , 2−β−6)}.
Hence, the probability of {q¯0 < qˆ(0)(M0)} is less than 2 · 2−β−6. Hence, in the above
proof, we replace the right hand side of (156) by 2 · 14 · 2−β−2 + 2√2√∑
s∈Ω P (s)Pph|s.
Then, we replace (157) by
‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1 ≤ 2 · 14 · 2−β−6 + 2
√
2 · 2−2β−42 ≤ 2−β (158)
because 2
√
2 + 14
16
(∼= 3.70) ≤ 4. Thus, we obtain Theorem 3 in the adjustment (57).
12. Conclusion and further improvement
In this paper, under the BB84 protocol with the decoy method, based on several observed
values, we have derived the required sacrifice bit-length S(M) = φˆ2(M)+2β+5, where
φˆ2(M) is given in Step (6). Under the above sacrifice bit-length, we have shown that
the final keys satisfy the security condition ‖ρA,E−ρideal‖1 ≤ 2−β when the parameters
µ1, µ2, Ns, N0, N1, and N2 satisfy Condition 1. Hence, in order to apply our formula,
we need to choose the parameters µ1, µ2, Ns, N0, N1, and N2 so that Condition 1 holds.
This is a definitive requirement for our analysis. However, when we choose sufficiently
large integers Ns, N0, N1, and N2 for the two values µ1 and µ2− µ1, Condition 1 holds.
Indeed, when the two positive values µ1 and µ2− µ1 are quite small, we need to choose
quite large integers Ns, N0, N1, and N2. As the second requirement, we need to choose
the parameters µ1, µ2, Ns, N0, N1, and N2 so that Conditions 2 and 3 hold with a
high probability when there is no eavesdropper. This requirement is also satisfied when
the integers Ns, N0, N1, and N2 are sufficiently large and the noise in the channel is
sufficiently small. Indeed, it is not so difficult to realize sufficiently large Ns, N0, N1,
and N2 for these requirements because a universal2 hash function (or an ε-almost dual
universal2 hash function) with a large size can be implemented with a small cost [49].
Since the decoy method has so many parameters, it is quite difficult to derive
tight evaluation. The proposed method might be improved by modifying several points.
However, such a modification might make the protocol more complex. For example,
while we treat the decoding phase error probability and the estimation error probability,
separately, The paper [34] treated them jointly. In order to keep the simplicity, it is
better to treat these terms separately. Further, in Section 7, we proposed to treat the
probability based on the hypergeometric distribution by using the binomial distribution.
If we treat the probabilities given in Section 9 with the hypergeometric distribution, we
obtain a better evaluation, but our analysis becomes much harder.
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Therefore, we have to consider the trade-off between the complexity and the
tightness of our evaluation. This kind of trade-off cannot be ignored from an industrial
view point. If the protocol is more complex, the cost for maintenance becomes higher.
In particular, when we change the arrangement of the total system or we change the
parameter of the system, we have to rewrite the program for calculating the sacrifice
bit-length. If the protocol is simple, the change can be easily done. Otherwise, it spends
some additional cost. Hence, we have to take into account this trade-off. This paper
has treated this trade-off heuristically.
However, its systematic treatment might be possible partially in the following sense.
Assume that we employ the Renner’s formalism instead of the phase error correction
formalism. If we parametrize the channel with more parameters to be estimated, the
asymptotic key generation rate becomes better. One might consider that, if the number
of parameters describing the model increases, we obtain a better estimation of the model.
However, it is considered that it is not true in statistics. This is because if we do not have
enough data to characterize so many parameters, we obtain a larger error. In order to
resolve this problem, we have to treat the trade-off between the error and the number of
parameters. Such a problem is called the model selection. In order to treat this problem
quantitatively, we can use several information criteria, e.g., Akaike information criterion
(AIC)[43], Takeuchi information criterion (TIC)[44], and minimum description length
principle (MDL)[45]. If we employ the Renner’s formalism, and increase the number of
channel parameters for precise description of channel, we need to consider this kind of
trade-off. Currently, it is not known that what kind of information criterion is suitable
for the above our trade-off.
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Appendix A. Chernoff inequality
In this section, we derive a lower bound of the lower percent point X−per(N, p, α) with
probability α by using Chernoff inequality. When the random variable X obeys the
binomial distribution Bin(N, p), Chernoff inequality
Pp{X ≤ Nq} ≤ exp(−ND(q‖p)) (A.1)
holds with q < p, where the relative entropy D(q‖p) is defined as q log q
p
+(1−q) log 1−q
1−p
,
where Pp is the distribution when the success probability with one trial is p.
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Hence, letting q− be the solution of the equation D(q‖p) = − logα
N
with respect to
q with q < p, we obtain
Pp{X ≤ Nq−} ≤ exp(−ND(q−‖p)) = α. (A.2)
That is, we obtain X−per(N, p, α) ≥ Nq−. Similarly, letting q+ be the solution of the
equation D(q‖p) = − log α
N
with respect to q with q > p, we obtain X+per(N, p, α) ≤ Nq+.
Further, combining Pinsker inequality D(q‖p) ≥ 2(log e)(p− q)2, we obtain
Pp{X ≤ Nq} ≤ exp(−2(log e)N(p− q)2). (A.3)
Hence, solving the equation 2(log e)(p − q)2 = − logα
N
with respect to q, we obtain
two solutions q˜− := p −
√
− logα
2(log e)N
and q˜+ := p +
√
− logα
2(log e)N
. Then, we obtain
X−per(N, p, α) ≥ Nq˜− and X+per(N, p, α) ≤ Nq˜+.
Using the information geometry, we have a better evaluation than Pinsker inequality
as follows. The relative entropy can be written with an integral form as follows[46].
D(q‖p)
log e
=
∫ p
q
t− p
t(1− t)dt. (A.4)
We consider only the case p < 1/2. When q < p < 1/2, we have
D(q‖p)
log e
≥ (p− q)
2
2p(1− p) . (A.5)
Hence, solving the equation (p−q)
2
2p(1−p)
= − logα
N(log e)
with respect to q, we obtain the smaller
solution q¯− := p−
√
−2(logα)p(1−p)
(log e)N
. Then, we obtain X−per(N, p, α) ≥ Nq¯−.
The treatment for X+per(N, p, α) is a little complex. When p < q ≤ 1/2, we have
D(q‖p)
log e
≥ (p− q)
2
2q(1− q) . (A.6)
Hence, solving the equation (p−q)
2
2q(1−q)
= − logα
N(log e)
with respect to q, we obtain the
larger solution q¯+ :=
p−logα/(N log e)+
√
(−p2+p−logα/(2N log e))·(−2 logα)/(N log e)
1−2 logα/(N log e)
. Then, when
q¯+ ≤ 1/2, we obtain X+per(N, p, α) ≤ Nq¯+. Indeed, since q¯+ is complicated, we
introduce a simpler upper bound. Since
√
a + b ≤ √a+√b,
q¯+ ≤ qˆ+ := p− logα/(N log e) +
√
(−p2 + p)(−2 logα)/(N log e) +√(logα/(N log e))2
1− 2 logα/(N log e)
=
p− 2 logα/(N log e) +√p(1− p)(−2 logα)/(N log e)
1− 2 logα/(N log e) .
Then, when qˆ+ ≤ 1/2, we obtain X+per(N, p, α) ≤ Nqˆ+.
Appendix B. One-sided interval estimation
Appendix B.1. One-sided interval estimation based of F distribution
We consider lower one-sided interval estimation with the confidential level 1 − α when
we observe the value k subject to the binomial distribution Bin(N, p) with N trials and
probability p.
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For this purpose, when we fix an integer k and define the constants
n1 := 2(N − k + 1), n2 := 2k, f1 := n2
n1
(1− p)
p
, (B.1)
it is known that the random variable F (n1, n2) subject to F distribution with the freedom
(n1, n2) satisfies
P{F (n1, n2) > f1} = Pp{X ≥ k} =
N∑
i=k
(
N
i
)
pi(1− p)N−i. (B.2)
Our task is solving Pp{X ≥ k} = 1 − α with respect to p with p < kN for a given k.
Define f ∗1 to be the solution of P{F (n1, n2) > f1} = 1 − α with respect to f1. Then,
the solution p = n2
n1f∗1+n2
satisfies the equation n2
n1
(1−p)
p
= f ∗1 . Thus, we obtain
P n2
n1f
∗
1
+n2
{X ≥ k} = 1− α. (B.3)
That is, n2
n1f∗1+n2
is the lower confidence limit p−est(N, k, α) of the lower one-sided interval
estimation with the confidential level 1− α when we observe the value k.
Similarly, when we fix an integer k and define the constants
m1 = 2(k + 1), m2 = 2(N − k), f2 = m1
m2
p
(1− p) , (B.4)
it is known that the random variable F (m1, m2) subject to F distribution with the
freedom (m1, m2) satisfies
P{F (m1, m2) > f2} = Pp{X ≥ k}. (B.5)
Our task is solving Pp{X ≥ k} = α with respect to p with p < kN for a given k. Define
f ∗2 to be the solution of P (F (m1, m2) > f2) = α with respect to f2. Then, the solution
p = m1f2
m1f2+m2
satisfies the equation m1
m2
p
(1−p)
= f ∗2 . Thus, we obtain
P m2
m1f
∗
2
+m2
{X ≥ k}(1− m2
m1f ∗2 +m2
)N−i = α. (B.6)
That is, m2
m1f∗2+m2
is the upper confidence limit p+est(N, k, α) of the upper one-sided
interval estimation with the confidential level 1− α when we observe the value k.
Appendix B.2. Application of Chernoff inequality
Assume that we observe the random variable X subject to the binomial distribution
Bin(N, p) with N trials and probability p. For a fixed integer k, we have
Pp{X
N
≤ k
N
} ≤ exp(−ND( k
N
‖p)) (B.7)
with k
N
< p. Hence, letting p− be the solution of the equation D( k
N
‖p) = − logα
N
with
respect to p with k
N
< p, we obtain
Pp−{X
N
≤ k
N
} ≤ exp(−ND( k
N
‖p−)) = α. (B.8)
Thus, p− ≤ p−est(N, k, α). Similarly, letting q+ be the solution of the equation
D( k
N
‖p) = − logα
N
with respect to p with k
N
> p, we obtain p+ ≥ p+est(N, k, α).
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Further, combining Pinsker inequality D(q‖p) ≥ 2(log e)(p− q)2, we obtain
Pp{X
N
≤ k
N
} ≤ exp(−2(log e)N(p− k
N
)2). (B.9)
Hence, solving the equation 2(log e)(p − k
N
)2 = − logα
N
with respect to p, we obtain
two solutions p˜− := k
N
−
√
− logα
2(log e)N
and p˜+ := k
N
+
√
− logα
2(log e)N
. Then, we obtain
p˜− ≤ p−est(N, k, α) and p˜+ ≥ p+est(N, k, α).
Using the relation (A.4), we consider better bounds only for the case k
N
< 1/2.
Solving the equation
(p− k
N
)2
2 k
N
(1− k
N
)
= − logα
N(log e)
with respect to p with p < k
N
< 1/2, we obtain
the smaller solution p¯− := k
N
−
√
−2(log α) k
N
(1− k
N
)
(log e)N
. Then, we obtain p−est(N, k, α) ≥ q¯−.
The treatment for p+est(N, k, α) is a little complex. When
k
N
< p ≤ 1/2, we have
D( k
N
‖p)
log e
≥ (p− q)
2
2q(1− q) . (B.10)
Hence, solving the equation
(p− k
N
)2
2p(1−p)
= − logα
N(log e)
with respect to p, we obtain the larger
solution p¯+ :=
k/N−logα/(N log e)+
√
(−(k/N)2+k/N−logα/(2N log e))(−2 logα)/(N log e)
1−2 logα/(N log e)
. Then, when
p¯+ ≤ 1/2, we obtain p+est(N, k, α) ≤ p¯+. Indeed, since p¯+ is complicated, we introduce
a simpler upper bound:
p¯+ ≤ pˆ+ := k/N − 2 logα/(N log e) +
√
k/N(1− k/N)(−2 logα)/(N log e)
1− 2 logα/(N log e) .
Then, when pˆ+ ≤ 1/2, we obtain p+est(N, k, α) ≤ pˆ+.
Appendix C. Calculation with the Gaussian case
In order to calculate the sacrifice bit-length given in Section 6, we need E[eµi ], E[µie
µi ],
E[µ2i e
µi ], and ω2. For this purpose, we calculate e
− 1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2 as follows.
de−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2
dx
= − 1
σ2
(x− (µ− σ2))e− 12σ2 (x−(µ−σ2))2 (C.1)
d2e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2
dx2
=
1
σ4
(x2e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2 − 2(µ− σ2)xe− 12σ2 (x−(µ−σ2))2
+ ((µ− σ2)2 − σ2)e− 12σ2 (x−(µ−σ2))2). (C.2)
Hence, xe−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2 , x2e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2 can be written by using e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2 and
its first and second derivatives as follows.
xe−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2 = − σ2de
− 1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2
dx
+ (µ− σ2)e− 12σ2 (x−(µ−σ2))2 (C.3)
x2e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2 = σ4
d2e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2
dx2
+ (2(µ− σ2)x− ((µ− σ2)2 − σ2))e− 12σ2 (x−(µ−σ2))2 . (C.4)
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We also prepare the following formula for e−xe−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 .
e−xe−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 = e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2
−x = e−
1
2σ2
(x2−2(µ−σ2)x+µ2)
= e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2e−
µ2
2σ2
+ (µ−σ
2)2
2σ2 = e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2e
(σ2−2µ)
2 . (C.5)
When X obeys the Gaussian distribution with the average µ and the variance σ2,
using (C.3), (C.4), and (C.5), we can calculate the expectations of e−x, xe−x, and x2e−x
as follows.
E[e−x] =
1√
2πσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
e−xe−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx =
e
(σ2−2µ)
2√
2πσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2dx
= e
(σ2−2µ)
2 (C.6)
E[xe−x] =
1√
2πσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
xe−xe−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx =
e
(σ2−2µ)
2√
2πσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
xe−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2dx
= e
(σ2−2µ)
2 (µ− σ2) (C.7)
E[x2e−x] =
1√
2πσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
x2e−xe−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx =
e
(σ2−2µ)
2√
2πσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
x2e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2dx
=
e
(σ2−2µ)
2√
2πσ2
(σ4
∫ ∞
−∞
d2e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2
dx2
dx+ 2(µ− σ2)
∫ ∞
−∞
xe−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2dx
− ((µ− σ2)2 − σ2)
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
1
2σ2
(x−(µ−σ2))2dx)
= e
(σ2−2µ)
2 ((µ− σ2)2 + σ2). (C.8)
Next, we calculate the real number ω2 when µ1 obeys the Gaussian distribution with
the average µ and the variance σ2.
ω2 :=
∞∑
n=2
E[e−µ1µn1 ]
n!E[e−µ1µ21]
=
1
E[e−µ1µ21]
E[e−µ1
∞∑
n=2
1
n!
µn1 ]
=
1
E[e−µ1µ21]
E[e−µ1((
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
µn1)− 1− µ1)] =
1
E[e−µ1µ21]
E[e−µ1(eµ1 − 1− µ1)]
=
1
E[e−µ1µ21]
(1− E[e−µ1 ]− E[µ1e−µ1 ]) = e
− (σ
2
−2µ)
2 − (µ− σ2)− 1
(µ− σ2)2 + σ2 . (C.9)
Appendix D. Relation with Eve’s success probability
We consider the state ρAE :=
∑
m P (m)|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρAE|m, where ρAE|m is the composite
state on (C2)⊗m⊗HE. Now, we consider a function f from ∪m{0, 1}m to {0, 1}. Then,
we have the state ρf(A),E =
∑
m P (m)ρf(A)E|m on C
2⊗HE. Due to the monotonicity of
the trace norm, the state ρf(A),E satisfies
‖ρf(A),E − ρf(A) ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ‖ρA,E − ρideal‖1. (D.1)
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When ρf(A),E = p0|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ0,E + p1|1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ1,E , due to the monotonicity of the
trace norm, any two-valued POVM {T, I − T} on HE satisfies
‖ρf(A),E − ρf(A) ⊗ ρE‖1
≥ p0(|Tr ρ0,ET − Tr(p0ρ0,E + p1ρ1,E)T |+ |Tr ρ0,E(I − T )− Tr(p0ρ0,E + p1ρ1,E)(I − T )|)
+ p1(|Tr ρ1,ET − Tr(p0ρ0,E + p1ρ1,E)T |+ |Tr ρ1,E(I − T )− Tr(p0ρ0,E + p1ρ1,E)(I − T )|)
= 4p0p1|Tr ρ0,ET − Tr ρ1,ET |.
When T supports f(A) = 0 and I − T supports f(A) = 1, the success probability is
bounded by
p0Tr ρ0,ET + p1Tr ρ1,E(I − T ) ≤ max(p0, p1)(Tr ρ0,E(I − T ) + Tr ρ1,ET )
= max(p0, p1)(1 + |Tr ρ0,ET − Tr ρ1,ET |) ≤ min(p0, p1)(1 + 1
4p0p1
‖ρf(A),E − ρf(A) ⊗ ρE‖1).
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